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ABSTRACT
Nearly 40 percent of the civil cases currently pending in federal
court—now over 130,000—are part of a multidistrict litigation, or
MDL. In MDL, all cases pending in federal district courts around the
country sharing a common question of fact, such as the defectiveness
of a product or drug, are transferred to a single district judge for
consolidated pretrial proceedings, after which they are supposed to
be remanded for trial. But the reality is that less than 3 percent are
ever sent back because the cases are resolved in the MDL court, either
through dispositive motion or mass settlement. Surprisingly, despite
the fact that the MDL court is where all of the action in these cases
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typically happens, that court need not have personal jurisdiction over
the plaintiffs or the defendants under the rules that would apply
were the cases being litigated one-by-one. Indeed, even as the Su-
preme Court has clamped down on personal jurisdiction in recent
years, the personal jurisdiction exercised in MDL has avoided
rigorous analysis for reasons that do not survive scrutiny. In this
Article, I examine how and why MDL has avoided these fundamental
questions and suggest a new way of analyzing MDL jurisdiction
under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, focusing on the
interests that the doctrine of personal jurisdiction attempts to serve,
especially the assurance of a forum that provides a fair opportunity
to participate. In particular, I explore the possibility of justifying
MDL on the basis of a national shared interest in efficient dispute
resolution, so long as such analysis adequately takes into account the
interests of the parties in a convenient forum. In so doing, I hope to
focus the discussion of jurisdiction in MDL—and of MDL gener-
ally—away from the fiction of “limited transfer” and to the reality of
aggregated, unitary litigation.
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“It’s not so much a where question, but a who question.”
—Elizabeth Cabraser, prominent plaintiffs’ lawyer, 
on the selection of multidistrict litigation judges1
INTRODUCTION
If there is one thing every first-year law student knows a lot
about, it is personal jurisdiction—a staple of every introductory
Civil Procedure course. But any 1Ls who have survived the journey
from Pennoyer2 to International Shoe3 to the Supreme Court’s recent
flurry of jurisdiction cases4 might be surprised to learn that in
nearly 40 percent of the cases on the federal civil docket, much of
what they learned is practically irrelevant.5
That is because those cases—as of August 2017, some 125,000 of
them—are consolidated as part of a multidistrict litigation, or
MDL.6 MDL, once thought to be an obscure, technical device, has
now become the centerpiece of nationwide mass tort litigation in the
wake of the decline of the tort class action.7 Under the MDL statute,
1. Elizabeth Cabraser, MDL Problems, Proceedings of the Section on Litigation, Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 6, 2017) (recording on file with the
Association of American Law Schools).
2. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. See generally Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.
Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). And, God forbid, Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958), which Geoffrey Hazard aptly described as containing “a line of analysis
that in all charity and after mature reflection is impossible to follow, no less to relate.”
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241,
244.
5. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 67, 72 (2017) (noting that “from 2002 to 2015, multidistrict proceedings leapt from
sixteen to thirty-nine percent of the federal courts’ entire civil caseload”); Judith Resnik,
“Vital” State Interests: From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts,
Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771 & fig.3 (2017)
(describing the “growth in the aegis of MDL”).
6. As of August 15, 2017, there are 125,868 cases pending in 230 multidistrict litigations
in 51 transferee districts before 180 district judges. MDL Statistics Report—Distribution of
Pending MDL Dockets by Actions Pending, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (Aug.
15, 2017), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/pending-mdls-0 [https://perma.cc/W4BD-V8NU].
7. See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 844-45 (2017); Judith Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due: Using
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28 U.S.C. § 1407, thousands of cases pending around the country
that share a common question of fact can be transferred to a single
district judge in any district for pretrial proceedings.8 The judge is
chosen by a panel of judges selected by the Chief Justice of the
United States called the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML).9 After such pretrial proceedings, the cases are to be re-
manded to the courts from which they came for trial,10 but this
rarely happens—less than 3 percent of the cases ever exit the MDL
court.11 Instead, most of the cases are either settled or resolved in
the MDL proceeding, meaning that, as in most federal litigation,
pretrial proceedings are the whole ballgame.12 While the cases are
in the MDL court, the MDL judge has all of the powers that the
transferor court would have, including the power to decide dis-
positive motions, and typically, the litigation is resolved by a mass-
settlement agreement reached within the MDL.13
Surprisingly, despite the fact that the MDL court does everything
that matters in the vast majority of cases transferred to it, it does
not need to be a court that would have personal jurisdiction under
the rules that would apply if the cases were treated as individual
litigations. Instead, according to the JPML and the few courts that
have analyzed the problem, an MDL can be located anywhere in the
Jurisdiction to Forge Post-Settlement Relationships Among Litigants, Courts, and the Public
in Class and Other Aggregate Litigation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1017, 1046 (2017) (“In earlier
decades, when MDL had a smaller footprint, it did not attract the ire leveled against Rule
23”); Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements,
63 EMORY L.J. 1339, 1346-47 (2014) (“As reliance on Rule 23 has diminished, MDL has
ascended as the most important federal procedural device to aggregate (and settle) mass
torts.”); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Con-
solidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 798 (2010)
(noting the “massive increase in MDL aggregate litigation” from 2004 to 2008).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
9. Id. § 1407(b), (d).
10. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998).
11. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 73
(2015).
12. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge
in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1270-75 (2017) (describing the scope of
pretrial proceedings); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United
States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 526 (2012) (noting how in general, “[p]retrial civil procedure has
become nontrial civil procedure”).
13. See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 270 (2011) (describing how MDL “creates the perfect conditions for an
aggregate settlement”).
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United States, essentially without limitation.14 As the JPML has
held, baldly: “Transfers under Section 1407 are simply not encum-
bered by considerations of in personam jurisdiction and venue.”15
For their part, federal courts have taken this analysis as a given—
those courts that have addressed whether there are any jurisdic-
tional limitations on the MDL forum have characterized such
arguments as “frivolous.”16
In this Article, I hope to demonstrate that questions about the
proper jurisdiction of MDL courts are not frivolous with respect to
defendants, who usually object, or plaintiffs. In an era in which the
Supreme Court has established significant new limits on personal
jurisdiction—particularly when plaintiffs are asserting claims
arising under state law—and in which MDL proliferates in federal
district courts, reexamination of the scope of personal jurisdiction
under the MDL statute is both timely and necessary.
Consider the largest MDL currently pending: the litigation
involving products liability and personal injury claims against six
manufacturers of the allegedly defective medical device, trans-
vaginal mesh. The MDL now includes over 60,000 cases and is
consolidated before the Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin in the
Southern District of West Virginia, located in Charleston.17 Under
the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction cases, this is a strange
result.18 None of the defendants in the litigation is incorporated or
14. See, e.g., In re FMC Corp. Patent Litig., 422 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (per
curiam) (citing In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 399 F. Supp. 1397, 1400 (J.P.M.L. 1976);
In re Revenue Props. Co., 309 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (J.P.M.L. 1970)); see also Margaret S.
Williams & Tracey E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The Decision to
Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 424, 427
(2013) (“The Panel’s decision on whether, where, and to whom to transfer these actions is
effectively unreviewable and has never been overturned.”).
15. In re FMC Corp., 422 F. Supp. at 1165.
16. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1432 (2d Cir. 1993).
17. See, e.g., In re C. R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2187,
2017 WL 2720292 (S.D. W. Va. June 22, 2017); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys.
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2325, 2017 WL 2609041 (S.D. W. Va. June 15, 2017); In re
Coloplast Corp. Pelvic Support Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2387, 2016 WL 6901776
(S.D. W. Va. Nov. 22, 2016); In re Bos. Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 2326, 2015 WL 1405493 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 26, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Fleming v. Bos. Sci.
Corp., 627 F. App’x 231 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); In re Ethicon, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys.
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2327, 2014 WL 186872 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 15, 2014); In re Cook
Med., Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., 949 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2013).
18. See infra Part I.A.
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has its principal place of business in West Virginia, meaning there
is no general jurisdiction over any of them in the state.19 And unless
a plaintiff is from West Virginia or had the device implanted there,
there is likely no specific jurisdiction in West Virginia in any of
these cases, especially after the Court’s 2017 decision in Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California.20
The case of plaintiff Maria Kafaty is instructive. She lives in
Hanford, California, and allegedly suffered injuries arising from the
implantation of a vaginal mesh device implanted in a nearby Fresno
hospital.21 She filed a lawsuit—asserting only claims arising under
California state law—in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California, in Fresno, against Boston Scientific Corpora-
tion.22 Boston Scientific Corporation is based in Massachusetts,
where it designed and manufactured the device that caused Kafaty’s
injuries.23 Shortly after Kafaty filed her case, in August 2012, it was
transferred to the MDL in West Virginia.24 Because the steering
committee of lawyers selected by the district judge prosecutes the
case, her lawyer is not involved.25 Absent the MDL, the case would
never have been sent to West Virginia. But, through the magic of
MDL, it was, and it was unlikely to ever return to California, except
19. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014) (restricting general jurisdiction
to forums in which the defendant is “essentially at home” (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011))).
20. See 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780-82 (2017). Even an expansive view of specific jurisdiction,
like the one outlined by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in J. McIntyre Co. v. Nicastro, would
likely not cover cases with no connection to West Virginia. See 564 U.S. 873, 901 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[A] forum can exercise jurisdiction when its contacts with the
controversy are sufficient.”).
21. Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, 7, Kafaty v. Bos. Sci. Corp., No. 1:12-cv-01290-AWI-
BAM (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012).
22. Id. at 1-3.
23. Id. at 2-3.
24. Conditional Transfer Order, In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 2326 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 24, 2012).
25. See Steering Committee, Lead and Liaison Counsel, In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic
Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2326 (S.D. W. Va. 2014), https://www.wvsd.uscourts.
gov/MDL/boston/pdfs/2326Steering%20Committee,%20Lead%20and%20Liaison%20Couns
el.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7GV-NUUJ].
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in the form of a settlement offer.26 And indeed the case was settled
while within the jurisdiction of the MDL court in West Virginia.27
How is this possible? The explanations given by the JPML and
the federal courts are insufficient and contradictory. For its part,
the JPML essentially disclaims that the transferee court is exercis-
ing personal jurisdiction at all.28 In its view, the power of the
transferee court is derivative of the power of the transferor court.29
That is, the JPML says that what matters is whether there is
jurisdiction in the transferor court because the MDL statute did not
purport to change the rules of personal jurisdiction or venue for any
individual case.30 The few federal courts that have examined this
issue have given a different answer. They say that even though
Congress has not provided for nationwide service of process, it has
the sovereign territorial power to provide for nationwide jurisdiction
anywhere within the borders of the United States over any case, and
it did so in the MDL statute.31 As a result, an MDL can be trans-
ferred to any district for pretrial proceedings, regardless of the
district’s connection to the litigation.
These two explanations are not only facially inconsistent, but
they are also individually unsatisfying. The JPML’s explanation,
that jurisdiction in the transferor court suffices, ignores the reality
of modern MDL practice, in which all of the action, including
potentially judgment, occurs in the transferee court.32 For instance,
26. See generally D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2175, 2177 (2017) (explaining how closure provisions encourage settlement and
discourage litigation).
27. Inactive Docket Order at 1, In re Bos. Sci. Corp. Pelvic Support Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 2326, No. 2:12-cv-04670 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 6, 2016) (retiring the consolidated
cases from the active docket as parties had agreed to a settlement model).
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. See infra Part II.C.
30. See In re Library Editions of Children’s Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (J.P.M.L.
1969) (“Congress, possessing nationwide sovereignty and plenary power over the jurisdiction
of the federal courts, has given no indication that, in creating § 1407, it intended to expand
the territorial limits of effective service. Therefore, proper service must still be made on each
defendant pursuant to the rules of the transferor court even after a transfer under § 1407.”).
31. See, e.g., Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 2010 WL 2545586, at *5 (6th Cir. June
16, 2010) (“The MDL statute is, in fact, legislation ‘authorizing the federal courts to exercise
nationwide personal jurisdiction.’” (citation omitted) (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab.
Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 163 (2d Cir. 1987))).
32. See, e.g., In re Zoloft (Sertralinehydrochloride) Prods. Liab. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 3d 483,
501-12 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (granting summary judgment on 333 transferred cases in a single
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in the recent nationwide products liability MDL involving the drug
Zoloft, the MDL court granted summary judgment against 333
transferred cases in one fell swoop.33 
The courts’ explanation is both incomplete—because the MDL
statute does not provide for nationwide service of process over any
claim, and such claims may not be filed directly in the MDL court
unless doing so would be allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4—and question-begging.34 That is, even if one were to accept that
MDL does provide for an innovative kind of nationwide personal
jurisdiction (as opposed to service of process) in any court where an
MDL is established,35 one must then assess whether such a statute
is constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment36—with respect to plaintiffs and defendants.
For if the MDL statute is in fact a nationwide personal jurisdic-
tion statute, then it is a quite grasping one for three reasons. First,
unlike most such statutes, which are directed at a discrete intracta-
ble problem and one substantive area of law, MDL applies to all
claims, whether they arise under federal or state law.37 Second,
unlike every other attempt at nationwide personal jurisdiction, the
MDL statute is not mitigated by a more specific venue statute or the
opportunity for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).38 The statute’s
opinion), aff’d, 858 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 2017).
33. See id.
34. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent
Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1189 n.194 (1998) (“There is no sugges-
tion that 28 U.S.C. § 1407 itself can be read, in effect, to authorize nationwide in personam
jurisdiction in the MDL transferee court, even if the transferor court itself lacked personal
jurisdiction.”).
35. Whether Congress may even do so is questionable, particularly in light of the Court’s
recent statement that “absent consent, a basis for service of a summons on the defendant is
prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549,
1556 (2017).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
37. See ROBERT C. CASAD & LAURA J. HINES, JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION § 6:2
(2d ed. 2015) (noting that Congress has not attempted to establish nationwide personal
jurisdiction over state law claims).
38. See Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction
in the Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 62 (1984) (“Scrutiny of [nationwide personal
jurisdiction] statutes ...  reveals ... that Congress on most occasions has attempted to protect
defendants from trial at fundamentally unfair locations by simultaneously enacting restrictive
venue provisions.”); see also Howard M. Erichson, Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in
All Federal Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1149 (1989) (describing
“filters” of due process limits and venue transfer statutes that typically apply to mitigate
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provision that a case be transferred to “any district ... for the
convenience of parties and witnesses [that] will promote the just
and efficient conduct”39 of the litigation is functionally meaningless
when the litigants are scattered throughout the country.40 Third,
there is very limited opportunity for appellate review of the choice
of MDL court made by the JPML. Review is available only by extra-
ordinary writ, and reversal of the JPML’s choice of forum has never
been granted.41 Ultimately, then, if one concludes that the MDL
statute does authorize a kind of national jurisdiction, then it is one
that truly tests the outer limits of due process, particularly with
respect to garden-variety, state law tort cases.42
In this Article, I argue that we should think differently about
personal jurisdiction in MDL, and that MDL provides an opportu-
nity to think differently about personal jurisdiction in general.
Functionally, the MDL court is exercising a kind of nationwide per-
sonal jurisdiction.43 This expansive jurisdiction cannot, however, be
solely justified as a matter of national sovereign territorial power,
as the courts suggest,44 but must be justified as a matter of federal
harshness of nationwide personal jurisdiction). Indeed, in interpleader, perhaps the most
expansive assertion of nationwide personal jurisdiction over claims sounding in state law,
transfer is available under § 1404(a). See, e.g., Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Economou, 557
F. Supp. 2d 216, 221 (D.N.H. 2008) (noting that the usual presumption in favor of the plain’tsiff
choice of forum does not apply in interpleader); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rodano, 493 F.
Supp. 954, 955 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (granting a motion to transfer in an interpleader case). Even
in bankruptcy cases, transfer is available, see, e.g., In re Bauer, No. 09-32001, 2010 WL
1905087, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. May 12, 2010), though apparently denials of motions to
transfer outpace grants, see Jeffrey T. Ferriell, The Perils of Nationwide Service of Process in
a Bankruptcy Context, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1199, 1207-08 (1991); Jackie Gardina, The
Bankruptcy of Due Process: Nationwide Service of Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the
Bankruptcy Code, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 37, 58-59 (2008).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
40. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-
Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 482-83 (1992).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e); see also Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlo-
cutory Appellate Review in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1663 (2011)
(arguing for the expansion of the right to appeal in MDL proceedings).
42. See Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1589, 1604 (1992) (“In the context of the federal courts and the Fifth Amendment, it may well
be a denial of due process to subject a defendant to jurisdiction in an unfair or inconvenient
forum without institutional protections against that result. That problem would emerge,
however, only in the unlikely event that Congress actually did repeal the venue and venue
transfer statutes.”).
43. See infra Part III.
44. See, e.g., Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., No. 09-3406, 2010 WL 2545586, at *5
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interest. That is, the question should be whether MDL is acceptable
because it is consistent with the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause, because the national interest in efficient dispute resolution
justifies any practical inconveniences to the parties in most MDL
cases.45 If one agrees that such jurisdiction is typically reasonable,
however, that does not mean that MDL’s jurisdiction is unlim-
ited—instead, it means that the Fifth Amendment imposes limita-
tions on the JPML in choosing a transferee district, and there are
aspects of MDL practice that should be observed to ensure that the
inconveniences to parties that MDLs may create are not swept
under the rug.46
In Part I of this Article, I briefly lay out the current law of
personal jurisdiction in the federal courts under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which remains in flux—particular-
ly after the Court’s 2017 decision in Bristol-Myers, which explicitly
left the question open.47 Although I argue that federal courts are
less constricted than state courts in exercising jurisdiction, the
extent of those constraints is a subject of some dispute.48 The Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause creates limits on the jurisdiction
of federal courts based on an analysis of reasonableness—limits that
must exist to ensure that individual litigants are provided a fair
opportunity to be heard.49 But those limits are more relaxed than
those imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.50 This
is because federal courts are not constrained by state borders, and
because federal court action may be justified more easily by a
national, federal interest.51 Here, I also lay out the theoretical basis
for adjudicatory jurisdiction that can support MDL.
In Part II, I turn to the MDL statute. There, I examine the origins
of the MDL statute, develop the unsatisfying jurisprudence in this
(6th Cir. June 16, 2010).
45. See infra Part III.
46. See infra Part III.
47. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1777, 1783-84
(2017) (“[S]ince our decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific
jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the
same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.”).
48. See infra Part I.B.
49. See infra Part I.B.
50. See infra Part I.B.
51. See infra Part I.B.
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area by the JPML and the federal courts, and discuss how MDL
judges are chosen. As a matter of currently unquestioned doctrine,
it is clear: personal jurisdiction just does not matter in MDL—a
result that the creators of the statute, who sought to centralize
control of nationwide litigation in the hands of individual federal
judges, intended.52 The problem, however, is that the reasons why
we restrict personal jurisdiction do not disappear because an MDL
has been created; they are just ignored. I argue that we cannot
sweep aside these problems so easily. The explanations given for
why MDL courts have unlimited national jurisdiction are unsatisfy-
ing. Closer inquiry is required, both of why personal jurisdiction has
been completely ignored, and, if one stops ignoring it, whether and
when MDL passes constitutional muster.
That personal jurisdiction gets short shrift in MDL comes as little
surprise. Rather, it is an example of how MDL’s structure facilitates
aggregate litigation by formally adhering to traditional norms of
individual autonomy and decentralized trials.53 As David Shapiro
once wrote, sometimes “light from one corner can help to illuminate
the whole room.”54 So it is with respect to personal jurisdiction in
MDL—the possibility of potential return for local trial makes pos-
sible the aggregation of thousands of cases in a single forum that
might otherwise be impossible.55 In that sense, understanding how
personal jurisdiction problems are swept aside reveals a great deal
about how MDL works generally. One goal of this Article is to
explain jurisdiction in MDL without relying on the crutch of limited
transfer, but to instead take MDL for what it is, an aggressive
aggregation device, and ask whether the jurisdiction exercised is
justifiable.
52. See infra Part II.A.
53. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 846-47; see also Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One
Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural
Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 110 (2015) (explaining that MDL litigation’s procedure
threatens passive claimants’ constitutional interests).
54. David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1969 (1989).
55. Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1471 (1987)
(reviewing RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE (1985)) (describing complex litigation procedures
as “dubious packaging strategies that are supposedly provisional but that in substantive
terms may be irremediable”).
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And indeed, in most cases I think the jurisdiction exercised by
MDL courts is constitutional—to conclude otherwise would be a
surprising development, to say the least, in light of MDL’s accep-
tance and growing importance in our litigation scheme.56 Instead,
perhaps it means MDL should inform the way we think about
personal jurisdiction—over both plaintiffs and defendants. MDL is,
in a real sense, inconsistent with the way we think about personal
jurisdiction over state law claims—to divide the jurisdiction of
federal courts up based on state court limitations is plainly insuf-
ficient to accomplish what MDL needs to do, and what its creators
intended it do: centralize nationwide litigation in a single forum.57
The real question should not be whether we can graft personal
jurisdiction case law onto MDL, but whether the MDL scheme
fulfills one of the central aims of the Due Process Clause: to provide
a meaningful opportunity to be heard.58 Ultimately, what MDL’s
dominance shows us is that our usual notions of limitations on
personal jurisdiction will, almost by necessity, take a back seat to
the very modern need to resolve the kind of mass litigation spawned
by our national economy.
In Part III of the Article, I attempt a rethinking of the bases for
personal jurisdiction under the MDL statute. To do so requires not
only a common sense analysis of both the benefits and burdens on
the parties in MDL, but also the recognition of the national interest
underlying the federal MDL statute—the interest in efficient reso-
lution of nationwide mass torts. Such an interest will, in most cases,
render application of the MDL statute constitutionally reasonable,
unless the burdens imposed on the parties are substantial. But the
JPML cannot avoid doing such analysis based on the incorrect as-
sumption that the Constitution does not require it. To do so should
not, as I lay it out, be especially onerous, but it does require atten-
tion to the differing circumstances of plaintiffs and defendants. It
also may require other reforms in MDL practice to ensure that it is
a fair deal, and that the inconveniences that the statute imposes do
56. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
57. See infra Part II.A.
58. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (“A fundamental requirement
of due process is ‘the opportunity to be heard.’ It is an opportunity which must be granted at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,
394 (1914))).
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not overwhelm the benefits of nationwide coordination. Finally, I
suggest that the leeway in personal jurisdiction provided by the
MDL statute demands enhanced respect in diversity cases for state
choice-of-law rules. To be included in an MDL may create geo-
graphic inconvenience, but it should not eliminate parties’ and
states’ interests in applying the otherwise applicable substantive
law.
In short, as MDL becomes ever more dominant, it becomes
necessary to assess it for what it actually is: an aggressive use of
federal power. Whether such power is constitutionally justifiable
turns not on a set of convenient fictions but on a balancing of the
relevant interests. Actually doing that balancing will aid in ensur-
ing that MDL is both effective and fair—and consistent with funda-
mental principles of due process.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
A. Personal Jurisdiction Generally
The American personal jurisdiction story is familiar and oft told,
but a short retelling is necessary to set the scene for analysis of its
relationship with MDL.59 According to the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, a court exercises personal, or adjudicatory,
jurisdiction “whenever action is taken in a judicial proceeding; that
is, by a duly authorized state official ... in the settlement of an
individual controversy through the application of legal principles.
The usual product of an exercise of judicial jurisdiction is a judg-
ment rendered in proceedings at law or in equity.”60 It is intuitive
that there must be some limitations on a court’s adjudicatory ju-
risdiction—every court in the world cannot decide every case, and
even if they did, other courts might not recognize or enforce the
59. See Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and
Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 413 (1981) (noting the tendency for jurisdiction
pieces to “‘reinvent’ the wheel by persistently reciting the history of the subject under study”
(quoting Lawrence R. Velvel, Suggested Improvements in Education, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 194,
201 (1978))).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
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judgments.61 There must be some organizing principle that justifies
a court’s deciding a case involving parties from other states.
Within the United States, it has always been the case that our
various courts have admitted some limitations to their adjudicatory
jurisdiction, both statutory and constitutional, but the source of
those limitations and the interests they serve are a subject of
disagreement and confusion.62 The main problem, as others have
noted, is that the Supreme Court does not seem to have a clear
consensus on what its personal jurisdiction doctrine is trying to do,
or how it is supposed to operate.63 At various points, the Court has
emphasized several different goals that limitations on jurisdiction
are attempting to achieve, such as protecting defendants from
abusively inconvenient forums, ensuring a convenient forum for
plaintiffs, vindicating a state’s ability to regulate a defendant acting
with its borders, and limiting the power of states to infringe upon
sister states’ sovereignty.64
Despite the messiness, it is fair to say that two main theoretical
justifications for limitations on jurisdiction persist, in “uneasy
coexistence”: power and reasonableness.65 The power theory holds
61. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1127 (1966).
62. See ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 79 (2007) (“American thinking and practice respecting adjudica-
tory authority ... [is] convoluted, and not lacking in ambiguity.”); Stephen B. Burbank, All the
World His Stage, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 741, 743 (2004) (reviewing ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003))
(explaining that American jurisdictional law is “inconsistent if not incoherent”); A. Benjamin
Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 618 (2006)
(“[T]he law of personal jurisdiction has blossomed into an incoherent and precarious
doctrine.”).
63. See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (2010) (“Even basic
foundational questions [concerning personal jurisdiction jurisprudence] are hotly contested
despite more than two centuries of doctrinal evolution.”); Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress
Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (2014) (noting “the sad state
of personal jurisdiction law”).
64. See Erbsen, supra note 63, at 5 (“[T]he Court has unhelpfully opined that the forum
state’s interests in providing a forum matter except when they don’t, that burdens on nonres-
ident defendants are material except when they aren’t, and that the plaintiff ’s interest in
finding a convenient forum is important except when it isn’t.” (footnotes omitted)). 
65. See VON MEHREN, supra note 62, at 101 (noting that “International Shoe announced
a new jurisdictional theory without excluding the older, territorially based, power theory,”
creating “the uneasy coexistence”). Compare Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977)
(“[A]ll assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set
forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”), with Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495
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that there are limitations on a state’s territorial sovereignty that
define the boundaries on the exercise of jurisdiction.66 By contrast,
the reasonableness theory holds that each exercise of jurisdiction
must be measured according to the facts of the particular case, the
interests of the parties, and the interests of the forum state.67 The
power theory tends to lay out ex ante rules that permit and restrict
jurisdiction for easy adjudication,68 while the reasonableness theory
elevates the need to tailor the doctrine to do justice in the individual
case.69
Though its roots are deeper,70 it is reasonable to begin the histor-
ical account of American personal jurisdiction doctrine in 1878 with
Pennoyer v. Neff, the poster child for the “power theory” of jurisdic-
tion.71 Drawing on international law, Justice Stephen Field pre-
sented a doctrine of jurisdiction based on the territorial sovereignty
of a state within its borders.72 Because a state is all-powerful within
its borders and powerless without, its courts could exercise in
personam jurisdiction on people served with process in the state, in
rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over property located within the
state’s borders, and none without.73 Jurisdiction, under Pennoyer, is
U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“The logic of Shaffer’s holding ... does not compel the
conclusion that physically present defendants must be treated identically to absent ones.”).
66. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); VON MEHREN, supra note 62, at 86
(explaining that “Pennoyer v. Neff and its progeny gave constitutional standing to territorial
approaches to the allocation of adjudicatory authority and the power theory of jurisdiction”).
67. See VON MEHREN, supra note 62, at 95 (characterizing this strand of jurisprudence as
based on “intuitively held standards of convenience and fairness”); cf. Peter L. Markowitz &
Lindsay C. Nash, Constitutional Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153, 1173 (2014) (“[T]he Court [is]
struggling with two distinct, and sometimes competing, notions of the due process interest
related to personal jurisdiction[:] ... notions of fairness to the defendant—protection against
being haled into court in a far-off forum ... [and] the permissible scope of sovereign author-
ity.”).
68. See VON MEHREN, supra note 62, at 95 (describing how “American courts asserted
adjudicatory authority over legal persons on the basis of ... ‘consent’ or ‘presence’”).
69. Burbank, supra note 62, at 743-44 (describing how American jurisdictional doctrine
struggles in balancing “ease of administration and predictability, on the one hand, and doing
justice in the individual case ... on the other”). 
70. See, e.g., D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 175-76 (1851).
71. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). I will bypass indulging in a recap of the grand tale of Marcus Neff,
John Mitchell, and Sylvester Pennoyer, but for a wonderfully detailed telling of the Pennoyer
story and an analysis of the opinion, see Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive
Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1987).
72. Perdue, supra note 71, at 502 (“The basic premise of the opinion [in Pennoyer] is that
there are limitations on state power that are simply inherent in the nature of government.”). 
73. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722 (describing the “two well-established principles of public
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therefore a function of territorial power.74 Famously, Justice Field
considered these limitations on state court jurisdiction a matter of
constitutional law under the Due Process Clause of the recently
ratified Fourteenth Amendment.75 As a result, for better or worse,
the law of personal jurisdiction has developed as constitutional law
expounded by the Supreme Court.76
Even charitably interpreted, Pennoyer is a bit of a mess. Here is
not the place for a Festivus-esque airing of grievances against Jus-
tice Field, but suffice it to say the opinion has its problems.77 Best
ventilated is the fact that the power theory is untenable in a world
where multistate cases are common. In short, as it became clear
that activities by out-of-staters would regularly cause harm to in-
staters, the notion of jurisdiction limited by territorial power over
the person or property located within the borders was exposed as
plainly insufficient.78 Pennoyer itself contains numerous ad hoc
law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State over persons and property,” namely,
that “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory,” and that “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory”).
74. See VON MEHREN, supra note 62, at 86; see also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91
(1917) (“The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.”). 
75. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733 (holding that the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the defendant “be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the
State, or his voluntary appearance”); Perdue, supra note 71, at 502 (stating that Justice Field
“invoke[d] the due process clause as a mechanism to which the federal courts may turn to
ensure that states do not exceed the inherent limitations on their power”).
76. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning
of the Millennium?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 114 (1999) (noting American jurisdiction
law “imposed substantial costs as a result both of the uncertainty of jurisdictional standards
tied to changing (but ever fact-dependent) constitutional norms”); John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls
of “Hint and Run” History: A Critique of Professor Borchers’s “Limited View” of Pennoyer v.
Neff, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 644 (1995) (noting that Pennoyer made clear that it “was
prepared to enforce its view of common-law jurisdictional principles” under the Fourteenth
Amendment). 
77. I am likely more willing than most to cut Justice Field a bit of slack, but Geoffrey
Hazard’s view is representative: “Appraised by contemporary critical standards for assessing
logic and policy in judicial decision, Pennoyer v. Neff arouses dismay and even despair.... That
it survives at all is some kind of a monument to American legal thought.” Hazard, supra note
4, at 271-72. Nevertheless, Pennoyer has its defenders. See generally, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs,
Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2017).
78. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927); see also VON MEHREN, supra note
62, at 95 (“The emergence in the United States of a jurisdictional theory based on litigational
justice was due more to the constraints that the power theory imposed than to the excesses
that it permitted.”); Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the
In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts—from Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI.
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exceptions to a state’s power running out at the border based on
necessity.79 Moreover, as cases with multistate elements proliferated
as the nation became more interconnected, courts further watered
down the Pennoyer rule either by creating additional exceptions or
finding ways to modify the rule itself to fit new facts.80
The second major problem with Pennoyer is that it both conflates
and does not realistically protect the two central interests of due
process: notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. In Pen-
noyer itself, Justice Field seemed to assume that a limitation on the
forum state’s jurisdiction to its territory would serve both purposes.
That is, limiting a state to jurisdiction over what is within it would
serve as protection against an abusive forum, and requiring at-
tachment of land or personal service within the borders of the state
would ensure notice.81 As Geoffrey Hazard explained more than fifty
years ago, these two protections are distinct—a party can receive
adequate notice of a lawsuit in an unconstitutionally unfair forum,
just as a party can be sued in a convenient forum without being
fairly notified of the lawsuit.82 Ultimately, then, elegant though the
theory was, Pennoyer did not really solve either problem. Its ap-
proach could allow for binding judgments against defendants who
lived or had property within the state without adequate notice, and
it potentially allowed for quasi in rem jurisdiction over nonresidents
whose only contact with the state might be ownership of land there.
Eventually, the Pennoyer rules needed to be modified, and the Court
struck the major blows in two cases: International Shoe Co. v.
L. REV. 569, 573 (1958) (noting that “[t]he rapid development of transportation and communi-
cation ... demanded a revision” of Pennoyer).
79. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 310-11 (1956) (noting that “physical power fails
completely as a rationale”); Hazard, supra note 4, at 271 (describing the exceptions to the gen-
eral theory outlined in Pennoyer as incoherent).
80. See Clermont, supra note 59, at 415 (describing how “the courts by constitutional
interpretation elaborated and expanded the traditional bases of power for jurisdiction over
a defendant”); Ehrenzweig, supra note 79, at 309-11 (listing exceptions created by the Court
after Pennoyer and stating that “[i]n view of these ‘exceptions’ there seems to be little left of
the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff ”).
81. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726 (1877) (describing how judgments by courts
without jurisdiction “would be the constant instruments of fraud and oppression”).
82. Hazard, supra note 4, at 269 (explaining that the Pennoyer system was both inco-
herent and allowed for unfair judgments); see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 61,
at 1134 (noting conflation of issues of power and notice).
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Washington83 in 1945 and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.84 in 1950.
First, after courts had persisted for nearly seven decades in
softening Pennoyer’s rigid territorial doctrine to suit the needs of
increasing interstate activity, the Supreme Court finally stopped
trying to fit square pegs into round holes and reformulated the
doctrine in International Shoe.85 The case involved the State of
Washington’s attempts to assess unemployment tax against the
Missouri-based International Shoe Company for its Washington-
based salesmen.86 The defendant company had engaged in all sorts
of machinations to avoid being legally “present” in the state and
thus, also avoid being subject to the jurisdiction of the Washington
court.87 Although the Court could have decided that the defendant
was sufficiently present in Washington under the Pennoyer-rooted
extant doctrine,88 instead it made a major shift, holding that
International Shoe was subject to the jurisdiction of the Washington
courts, not because it was “present,” but because it was fair and
reasonable.89
In International Shoe, the Court issued its famous pronounce-
ment, still good law today, that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”90
83. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
84. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
85. See VON MEHREN, supra note 62, at 95 (describing International Shoe as “the decisive
step in the emergence in the United States of an alternative theory of jurisdiction instrumen-
tal in nature and based on litigational fairness”).
86. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311-13.
87. See id. at 313-14.
88. See id. at 319-20.
89. See Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shop-
ping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 806
(1995) (“[T]raditional doctrinal framework easily could have accommodated the facts of
International Shoe.”).
90. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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Chief Justice Harlan Stone’s opinion in International Shoe, like his
contemporaneous opinions in the area of choice of law,91 moved
away from territorial considerations to a consideration of the forum
state’s interest in adjudicating the case, and the nature of the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state balanced by a practical
assessment of the burden on the defendant on litigating away from
home.92 International Shoe was a watershed.93 Its “minimum
contacts” framework did not entirely do away with the territorial
underpinnings of Pennoyer,94 but it did represent a different way of
thinking about jurisdiction in terms of reasonableness, based on
balancing the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the forum
state.95 In practice, International Shoe spawned a significant expan-
sion of state exercises of jurisdiction, as legislated by expansive
state long-arm statutes.96
91. See Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska
Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532 (1935). For discussions of these
cases, see Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multi-
district Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 768 (2012) (describing Stone’s “more flexible
approach to constitutional limits on choice of law”); and Clyde Spillenger, Risk Regulation,
Extraterritoriality, and Domicile: The Constitutionalization of American Choice of Law, 1850-
1940, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1240, 1319-25 (2015). 
92. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (“[T]he demands of due process ... may be met by such
contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context
of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there. An ‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would result to the
corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or principal place of business is relevant in this
connection.” (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930))).
93. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global
Resolution of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 917, 919 (1995).
94. See VON MEHREN, supra note 62, at 100 (“Chief Justice Stone’s ‘minimum contacts’
language and his use of the ‘presence’ metaphor do have territorial undertones.”).
95. See id.; see also Clermont, supra note 59, at 416 (“With some indulgence, one could
read International Shoe as reducing the power test to the status of a rough rule of thumb,
with its outcome always subject to revision under the ultimate test of reasonableness. So to
get to the basics, instead of asking whether the target of the action was subject to the state’s
power, one should ask whether jurisdiction was reasonable in view of all the interests
involved.”); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 61, at 1147 (describing International Shoe
as “a new analytical approach which permits the assumption of jurisdiction over any matter
that bears a reasonable and substantial connection to the forum community”).
96. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention
and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 210 (2001) (“[T]he greater latitude to
assert jurisdiction afforded the states by International Shoe and its progeny dramatically
enhanced the opportunities for interstate forum shopping.” (footnote omitted)). Professor
Stephen Burbank has also argued, provocatively, that International Shoe may have been
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With respect to notice, Justice Robert Jackson struck the critical
blow in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.97 Mullane
involved a statutory scheme in which New York allowed pooling of
small trusts into one larger trust.98 In order to both give an oppor-
tunity for beneficiaries to challenge any self-dealing and to allow the
trustee to move forward without looming clouds of litigation, the
statute provided for an accounting proceeding every three years.99
Beneficiaries would be notified only by publication of their opportu-
nity to appear in the accounting (a special guardian would be
appointed to protect the interests of the beneficiaries who did not
appear or were not notified), and a finding that everything was on
the up-and-up would be binding on all involved.100 The special
guardian for the beneficiaries, Kenneth Mullane, challenged this
setup under the Due Process Clause, claiming both that the notice
by publication was insufficient and that the New York court did not
have personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state beneficiaries.101
In an opinion remarkable for its candor, Justice Jackson partially
rejected the statutory scheme as incompatible with due process.102
But in so doing, he decoupled the issues of personal jurisdiction and
notice.103 With respect to the former, the parties were fighting over
whether the jurisdiction asserted by the New York court was in
personam or in rem under the Pennoyer scheme.104 If the jurisdiction
were based on the trust’s presence in New York, it would be in rem
and there would be jurisdiction over the out-of-staters, but if the
jurisdiction were in personam, then, in theory, the out-of-staters
might be beyond the reach of the New York courts.105 In language
that must have been heartening to law students ever since, Justice
Jackson swept the problem aside, calling the in personam/in rem
“animated in part by the desire to reduce forum shopping against corporations ... [b]y enabling
states to assert activity-based personal jurisdiction without resort to fictions such as corporate
presence.” See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1478-80 (2008).
97. See 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
98. See id. at 307-08.
99. See id. at 309.
100. Id. at 309-10.
101. See id. at 306, 311-12.
102. See id. at 320.
103. See id. at 318-19.
104. See id. at 311-12.
105. See id.
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distinction “elusive and confused generally.”106 Instead, what mat-
tered was a practical assessment:
It is sufficient to observe that, whatever the technical definition
of its chosen procedure, the interest of each state in providing
means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are
administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent
and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its
courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or
nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to
appear and be heard.107
Having bracketed the metaphysical question of power, Justice
Jackson turned to whether the notice-by-publication scheme com-
plied with due process.108 To do so, the Court would need to balance
the interest of individuals in being notified, their having the op-
portunity to participate, and the state’s interest in facilitating trusts
without “impossible or impractical obstacles in the way.”109 Ulti-
mately, the Court concluded that with respect to beneficiaries whose
addresses were known, the scheme was inadequate, but with
respect to those whose location was not readily ascertainable, notice
by publication along with representation by a guardian was suffi-
cient.110 
Together, International Shoe and Mullane are very much of a
piece—both eschew old rigid rules in favor of balancing tests that
make a practical assessment of both the parties’ and the states’
interests.111 The question in both cases, though they address
different problems, is not one of territorial power, but one of reason-
106. Id. at 312 (“But in any event we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the
standards are so elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts
to define, may and do vary from state to state.”).
107. Id. at 313.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 313-14.
110. Id. at 317-20.
111. See Redish & Beste, supra note 93, at 936 (describing the analysis in Mullane as
“hard-nosed, commonsense pragmatism” that “focused on the practical implications of refus-
ing to find jurisdiction in the New York courts”); Resnik, supra note 5, at 1779-80 (describing
how Mullane “enshrined” the state’s ability to bind absentees to a lawsuit in service of “vital
state interests”); see also Clermont, supra note 59, at 417 (describing Mullane as rendering
Pennoyer “obsolete and superfluous”).
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ableness in light of the state’s legitimate interest in achieving its
goals and the parties’ interest in a meaningful ability to participate
in the process and protect their interests.112
Leaving aside the jurisprudence of effective notice,113 the Supreme
Court has sporadically attempted to clarify International Shoe with
varying degrees of success. Throughout, both the power and reason-
ableness theories have persisted, and both play a role in the prevail-
ing doctrine. Justice William Brennan’s majority opinion in Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz in 1985 is illustrative.114 In that case, the
Court explained that “the constitutional touchstone remains
whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’
in the forum State,” suggesting that the defendant’s connection with
the sovereign remains a necessary condition for the exercise of
jurisdiction.115 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan explained, “Once it
has been decided that a defendant purposefully established
minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be
considered in light of other factors to determine whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and
substantial justice.’”116 Then, Justice Brennan lists a series of
considerations that “serve to establish the reasonableness of juris-
diction”: the burden on the defendant, the forum state’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff ’s interest in a convenient
forum, the “interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies,” and the “shared interest
of the several [s]tates in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.”117
Although the emphasis in Burger King seemed far more on the
reasonableness side of the ledger—and indeed eight Justices
unanimously rejected an assertion of jurisdiction on reasonableness
grounds shortly thereafter in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
112. See supra notes 93-96, 107-09 and accompanying text. Judith Resnik has noted in a
pair of recent articles how Mullane inaugurated the doctrine of “jurisdiction by necessity,”
which would later be deployed by the drafters of the amendments to Rule 23 to justify broader
use of class actions. See Resnik, supra note 7, at 1022; Resnik, supra note 5, at 1791-92.
113. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 231, 238-39 (2006).
114. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
115. See id. at 474 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
116. Id. at 476 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
117. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)).
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Court of California118—at least four Justices on the Court, led by
Justice Antonin Scalia, asserted that territorial power was a
sufficient basis upon which to uphold the exercise of “tag jurisdic-
tion” in Burnham v. Superior Court of California.119 So the power
theory continues to lurk in the background, at least for some
Justices.120
Also lurking in the background has been the matter of consent,
which even in Pennoyer was a sufficient basis for jurisdiction.121
Courts have long held that a plaintiff is subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the court in which it has chosen to file,122 and
defendants are subject to jurisdiction through their consent, or
waiver of the right to object.123 Consent’s place in the jurisdictional
scheme has always been somewhat confusing, particularly if one
thinks of jurisdiction as a function of state power, but nevertheless,
the Court has held that, because personal jurisdiction protects a
party’s personal liberty interest, objections can be waived.124
In any event, after Burnham, the Court, evidently split on the
topic of personal jurisdiction, left the scene for two decades. It
returned, however, with renewed vigor in 2011, and it has decided
118. See 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987).
119. See 495 U.S. 604, 618-19 (1990) (plurality opinion).
120. See Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the
Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1272 (2011) (“At least three times in the
minimum contacts era the Court has buried the notion that the Due Process Clause imports
state sovereignty, but each time—as in a badly produced sequel to a horror movie—it pulls
itself from the grave, and in increasingly grotesque forms terrorizes the neighborhood.”
(footnote omitted)).
121. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726 (1877) (noting that a state could exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant through his “voluntary appearance”).
122. See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (“The plaintiff having, by his
voluntary act in demanding justice from the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court, there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as being there for all
purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his presence.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 34 (AM. LAW. INST. 1971) (“A state has power to exercise judicial
jurisdiction over an individual who brings an action in the state.”).
123. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 213 (11th ed. 2015).
124. See Ins. Corp. of Ire. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10
(1982) (“The restriction on state sovereign power ... must be seen as ultimately a function of
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.... [I]f the federalism
concept operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would
not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement.”).
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six personal jurisdiction cases since.125 Although the Court’s per-
formance in these cases has come in for justifiable criticism—par-
ticularly in the split opinions in the stream-of-commerce case, J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro126—we can draw some conclu-
sions from the Court’s jurisprudence in the area.
First, in all six cases the Court reversed lower court assertions of
jurisdiction,127 three times unanimously,128 suggesting that the
Court is attentive both to defendants’ interests and to aggressive
assertions of jurisdiction under state law. Second, as has been the
case since International Shoe, the power and reasonableness
theories of jurisdiction continue to coexist and are indeed both
occasionally noted.129 Third, the Court seemed particularly con-
cerned about plaintiff ’s forum shopping. Underlying the Court’s
opinions in five of the six cases (Nicastro aside) is the prevailing
sense that plaintiffs are trying to get away with something by
125. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); BNSF Ry.
Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (plurality opinion). The
Court similarly stayed out of the personal jurisdiction arena between 1958’s Hanson v.
Denckla and 1977’s Shaffer v. Heitner.
126. See 564 U.S. at 877 id. at 887 (Bryer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 893
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction After
Bauman and Walden, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 607, 609 (2015) (noting that “by destabilizing
personal jurisdiction doctrine, the Nicastro opinions made things worse”); Wendy Collins
Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the
Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729 (2012) (“Personal jurisdiction also seems to inspire
foolish remarks and poor opinions, and Nicastro may set a new low in that regard.”).
127. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777; BNSF Ry., 137 S. Ct. at 1554; Walden, 134 S. Ct. at
1121; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 931; Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 887
(plurality opinion).
128. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1118; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 750; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 917.
129. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion in Nicastro presented an odd mélange of sovereign-
ty and reasonableness rationales, see Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 880-87, a combination reiterated
by Justice Samuel Alito in Bristol-Myers, see Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780. Moreover, in
Nicastro, Justice Kennedy presents one of the odd puzzles regarding jurisdiction in MDL. In
his plurality opinion highlighting the “unique genius of our Constitution,” Justice Kennedy
suggests that “Congress could authorize the exercise jurisdiction in appropriate courts”
throughout the country over products liability actions. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 884-85. But
so long as Congress has not done so, jurisdiction must be determined “sovereign-by-sovereign,”
or, for state law claims, state-by-state. Id. at 884. MDL presents a challenge to Justice
Kennedy’s reasoning: if I am correct that MDL effectively authorizes a kind of nationwide
jurisdiction over state law claims like the one raised by the plaintiff in Nicastro, then Justice
Kennedy’s analysis is at least incomplete. See id. at 884-86.
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seeking a friendly forum with few connections to the facts of the
cases.130
In both the Court’s general and specific jurisdiction cases, the
Court has been restrictive. With respect to general jurisdiction, it is
fair to say that the Court has clamped down. In Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations v. Brown, and then Daimler AG v. Bauman, the
Court made clear that in all but exceptional cases, general jurisdic-
tion is limited to where the defendant is “essentially at home”: for
an individual, where she is domiciled, and for a corporation, the
state of incorporation and principal place of business.131 Although
the Court has been a bit gauzy about the reasons for restricting
general jurisdiction so rigidly, in so doing Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg cited “Pennoyer’s sway” and the “limits traditionally recog-
nized.”132 Whether she meant that general jurisdiction is moored to
territorial borders or simply that general jurisdiction must be
narrowly limited is left unsaid. With respect to specific jurisdiction,
the Court has also been restrictive. In striking down three exercises
of specific jurisdiction, the Court has made clear that the defendant
must create contacts with the forum state that are linked to the
underlying facts of the litigation.133
The overall result has been to clamp down on personal jurisdic-
tion with little in the way of theoretical development—the six cases
(Nicastro aside) have induced readily applicable holdings, but not
much development of the ultimate aims of the doctrine or the
relative roles of power and reasonableness. Indeed, in all three
specific jurisdiction cases, the Court does not reach the Burger King
reasonableness factors.134 Instead, the Court rejects jurisdiction at
130. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1779-80; BNSF Ry., 137 S. Ct. at 1558-59; Walden, 134
S. Ct. at 1124-26; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758-62; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 922-25.
131. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757-58 (“[W]e have declined to stretch general jurisdiction
beyond limits traditionally recognized.”); Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflec-
tions on Daimler and Its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 675, 678 (2015).
132. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757-58 (“Specific jurisdiction has been cut loose from Pennoyer’s
sway, but we have declined to stretch general jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally recog-
nized.”).
133. See, e.g., Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 (“For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent
with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection
with the forum State.”).
134. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
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the minimum contacts stage of the analysis,135 suggesting that the
Court is trending toward developing purportedly clear rules rather
than engaging in the sort of balancing suggested by Burger King
and Asahi.
B. Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts
Since Pennoyer, the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
has centered on limitations on state courts imposed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.136 After International
Shoe, states began to expand their assertions of jurisdiction,137 in
some cases to the outer limits of constitutional permission. The
Fourteenth Amendment, however, does not limit the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.138 Instead, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment limits federal courts’ assertions of jurisdiction.139 As a
practical matter, the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment loom
much larger in most cases because most federal court jurisdiction is
defined by the law of the states in which federal courts sit under
Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.140 As a
result, even in cases in which the Supreme Court is reviewing a
challenge to the personal jurisdiction of a federal court, it is looking
to the law of the state in which that court sits and its jurisprudence
under the Fourteenth Amendment.141
These limitations are, however, unnecessarily self-abnegating.
There is nothing inevitable about federal courts’ jurisdiction having
135. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781-82; Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124-26; J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886-87 (2011) (plurality opinion).
136. Fullerton, supra note 38, at 3.
137. Burbank, supra note 96, at 210-11.
138. Casad, supra note 42, at 1599.
139. Id.
140. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“In general[, s]erving a summons or filing a waiver of
service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant ... who is subject to the jurisdiction
of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.”); Daniel
Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts: Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and Stafford
v. Briggs, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 713, 715 (2015).
141. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (“[A] federal district court’s authority
to assert personal jurisdiction in most cases is linked to service of process” in a state); Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014) (“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in deter-
mining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”).
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anything to do with state borders.142 For instance, although federal
districts have always been organized according to state boundaries,
they need not be under Article III, which gives Congress leeway to
design a system of inferior courts as it sees fit.143 And in numerous
instances Congress has passed statutes providing for nationwide
personal jurisdiction, disconnecting the jurisdiction of a federal
district court from the state that surrounds it.144 Congress typically
accomplishes this by providing for “nationwide service of process”
under a particular substantive statute.145
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed Congress’s power to
provide for nationwide personal jurisdiction, but always in dic-
tum.146 Indeed, in 2017, the Court in Bristol-Myers again explicitly
“le[ft] open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the
same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a feder-
al court,” as it does on state courts.147 The Court has never assessed
whether the Fifth Amendment provides any limitations on district
courts if Congress has purported to give them nationwide jurisdic-
tion.148 Whether one thinks that there are any such limitations
142. See Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the
Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988) (“Congress could draw its judicial dis-
tricts anyway it wished, and therefore, federal court jurisdiction [i]s not limited by state
boundaries.”); Jamelle C. Sharpe, Beyond Borders: Disassembling the State-Based Model of
Federal Forum Fairness, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2897, 2917-18 (2009).
143. See James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s
Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1519 (2001); Sachs, supra note 63, at 1315-19.
144. See Sachs, supra note 63, at 1315-16.
145. See CASAD & HINES, supra note 37, § 6.2 (collecting statutes).
146. See Fullerton, supra note 38, at 29-30 (collecting cases and noting that all statements
about scope of federal court personal jurisdiction were in dicta, did not interpret the Fifth
Amendment, and were in cases in which the dispositive issue was one of statutory construc-
tion); see also Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Robertson v. R.R.
Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925).
147. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017).
148. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987)
(reserving question of “whether Congress could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based
on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and
the State in which the federal court sits”). The Court also dodged the question in Stafford v.
Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 529-30 (1980). See also Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the
Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 867, 882-83 (2012) (noting that in Nicastro, Justice Kennedy “carefully reserved the
question of whether it would be constitutional for the Congress, if it so chose, to designate the
United States as a forum for personal jurisdiction purposes for cases pending in federal
courts”).
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depends on one’s view of whether power or reasonableness provides
the basis for jurisdiction. Under a traditional, power-based view, a
federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction throughout the
nation because the sovereign power of the United States within its
borders is limitless.149 Just as states’ power is limited by their
borders, the United States’ power is limited by its far more expan-
sive borders. Consequently, on this view, there is nothing wrong
with a federal court exercising unlimited jurisdiction within the
territorial confines of the United States.150
But if reasonableness provides the basis for assertions of juris-
diction, then a federal court’s assertion of power must be assessed
in terms of fairness, convenience, and the interests of the parties
and the forum.151 As a result, a federal district court’s power is not
limitless throughout the entire United States, but must be justified
in terms of the circumstances of the particular case.152 A federal
district court’s assertion of jurisdiction may turn out to be as
149. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural
Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 437 (1992) (“If presence within the territory of the sovereign is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on its courts, then due process is no barrier to nationwide
service of federal process in federal question cases.”); Clermont, supra note 59, at 427
(describing the “traditional axiom” allowing nationwide jurisdiction in federal courts).
150. See CASAD & HINES, supra note 37, § 6.2 (explaining the view that federal courts may
exercise nationwide jurisdiction because “[f ]ederal sovereignty extends throughout the entire
territory of the United States”); John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 579, 584 (1984) (“[T]he Court has recognized no constitutional constraints on the federal
courts’ jurisdiction over United States citizens.”).
151. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); 4 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1068.1 (4th ed. 2015) (“Despite the rela-
tive dearth of case law on this point, it seems fair to generalize that an inquiry into fairness
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment tends to focus on the same factors
considered under the minimum contacts test, but often are applied with more flexibility than
under the Fourteenth Amendment analysis.”); Alexander, supra note 149, at 439 (“Surely
some version of minimum contacts analysis should be applied to federal court assertions of
jurisdiction. Since International Shoe, we have viewed the constitutionality of exercises of
personal jurisdiction as a question of fundamental fairness that turns on an individualized
evaluation of the burdens and inconvenience to the defendant in light of the relationship of
the defendant and the litigation to the forum.”); see also Fullerton, supra note 38, at 22
(explaining that, post-International Shoe, the sovereignty-based analysis is inadequate). The
Rules Committee has also nodded in this direction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k) advisory
committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“There also may be a further Fifth Amendment
constraint in that a plaintiff ’s forum selection might be so inconvenient to a defendant that
it would be a denial of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ required by the due process clause,
even though the defendant had significant affiliating contacts with the United States.”).
152. See 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 151, § 1068.1.
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unjustifiable as that of a state court across the street if it is so
geographically inconvenient as to prevent a party from fairly being
heard.153
Although the Supreme Court has indicated on occasion that it
subscribes to a more power-centric theory of federal court jurisdic-
tion, many of those assertions were pre-International Shoe, which
elevated reasonableness as a constitutional touchstone.154 The low-
er courts, for their part, remain somewhat split on the particulars
of the analysis, but they have all more or less gone down the same
hybrid path, fusing elements of the power and reasonableness theor-
ies as the Supreme Court has.155 Courts have generally concluded
that assertions of federal court jurisdiction, when authorized by a
federal statute, were to be measured according to the familiar
minimum contacts analysis, but the contacts to be considered are
not those with any particular state, but with the United States as
a whole.156 However, while there is a consensus that a “national
contacts” method of analysis is appropriate, the circuits differ in the
extent to which they are willing to entertain arguments that a feder-
al forum is unfair.157 As a general matter, the consensus approach
153. See Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 849, 904 (1989) (“In unusual cases where the burden of litigating in the distant
forum is so great that the noncitizen cannot present a fair defense, Congress is and should be
barred from conferring jurisdiction upon either state or federal courts.”).
154. Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Around Horizontal Federal-
ism Rather than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 769, 776 (2015)
(“The Supreme Court has explicitly declined to decide whether federal statutes authorizing
nationwide service permit personal jurisdiction ‘based on an aggregation of the defendant’s
contacts with the Nation as a whole, rather than on its contacts with the State in which the
federal court sits.’” (quoting Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102
n.5 (1987))).
155. See Erbsen, supra note 63, at 51-52.
156. See, e.g., Wallace v. Mathias, 864 F. Supp. 2d 826, 833 (D. Neb. 2012) (“[D]ue process
of law relates to the fairness of the exercise of power by a particular sovereign, and individual
liberty interests are not threatened when a federal district court sitting pursuant to federal
question jurisdiction exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has minimum
contacts with the United States.”).
157. Compare, e.g., Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Plumbing
Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 436, 444 (4th Cir. 2015) (requiring the defendant to show that “the
district court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over [them] would result in ‘such extreme
inconvenience or unfairness as would outweigh the congressionally articulated policy’
evidenced by a nationwide service of process provision” (alteration in original) (quoting
Denny’s, Inc. v. Cake, 364 F.3d 521, 524 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004))), with Peay v. BellSouth Med.
Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1211 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring the defendant to show
grave inconvenience as part of the national-contacts analysis).
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seems to me to be the right one—while presumptively there is power
to assert jurisdiction based on national contacts, the assertion of
jurisdiction of a particular district court may be constitutionally
unreasonable because of the inconveniences associated with its
geographic location.158 Federal court jurisdiction by definition,
allows for a more flexible analysis than state court jurisdiction
because the relevant contacts are not limited by the borders of
states, but the analysis is not boundless.159
Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court has never defined the
limitations on federal court jurisdiction imposed by the Fifth
Amendment.160 This is in part due to the fact that jurisdiction over
most claims in federal courts is determined by state law under Rule
4.161 But it is also because there are numerous statutory mecha-
nisms in the federal system to guard against potentially unreason-
able assertions of jurisdiction.162 There are of course the general
venue statutes, which apply in most cases.163 And there are specific
venue statutes that limit the available forums of claims for which
Congress has purportedly provided nationwide personal ju-
risdiction.164 The venue statutes thus provide for ex ante limitations
158. See Trs. Of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund, 791 F.3d at 444; Peay, 205
F.3d at 1211 & n.4.
159. See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE. L.J. 1, 30-31 (1986) (“[E]ven if
distinctions might be drawn between the territorial reach of state and federal courts in some
contexts, it seems difficult to justify due process differences affecting notice and opt-out
protection provided by Shutts when the alternative is to bind nonconsenting litigants by
adjudication in forums with which they have no affiliation. The disadvantages of distant
forum abuse are not mitigated by the forum’s federal rather than state character.”).
160. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. It has long been settled, however, that
Congress could go beyond Rule 4 in providing for federal jurisdiction over state law claims.
The leading case is Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 222-24 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc)
(Friendly, J.).
162. See Sharpe, supra note 142, at 2917 (explaining how venue restrictions mitigate the
harshness of nationwide personal jurisdiction); Erichson, supra note 38, at 1149 (describing
such mechanisms as “filters”).
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012).
164. See Fullerton, supra note 38, at 62 (noting that when Congress has authorized
nationwide jurisdiction, “Congress on most occasions has attempted to protect defendants
from trial at fundamentally unfair locations by simultaneously enacting restrictive venue
provisions”); see also Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2012) (“Any suit, ac-
tion, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only
in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be
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on the federal districts available in order to ensure a convenient
forum. But even if the venue statutes allow for a relatively inconve-
nient forum, the transfer statute is available to ensure that a
federal court can send a case to a more convenient district based on
a particularized assessment of the circumstances of an individual
case.165 As a result, even when Congress has provided for nationwide
personal jurisdiction without a limiting venue statute, as with
interpleader, the transfer statute is waiting in the wings to ensure
that the forum is not so geographically inconvenient that it raises
constitutional questions.166 The combined effect of these statutory
mechanisms is one that Stephen Burbank describes as “jurisdic-
tional equilibration” in that the potentially troubling effects of broad
personal jurisdiction are mitigated through other means.167 In other
words, to the extent that an assignment of nationwide personal
jurisdiction by Congress could produce troubling results in particu-
lar cases, there are mechanisms to prevent them.
The line where the constitutional protections of jurisdiction end
and those provided by venue statutes begin is a subject of persistent
debate.168 Ultimately, the question remains unresolved: What if a
federal statute provided for nationwide personal jurisdiction with no
applicable statutory limitations on venue?169 As a purely descriptive
 found or transacts business.”); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
§ 901, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (2012) (“All other process in any action or proceeding under this
chapter may be served on any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is
found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.”); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (2012) (“Venue shall lie
in any district in which the release or damages occurred, or in which the defendant resides,
may be found, or has his principal office.”).
165. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also Purcell, supra note 40, at 482 (arguing that
Congress’s purpose in enacting the transfer statute was to “limit[ ] the ability of parties to ex-
ploit geography as a litigation weapon. It sought, in particular, to restrict those who selected
forums with little or no substantial connection to either the parties or the claim, and to block
organized classes of litigants who attempted systematically to use the weapon of geography.”).
166. See Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Economou, 557 F. Supp. 2d 216, 221 (D.N.H. 2008)
(noting that in interpleader cases, there is no presumption in favor of the plaintiff ’s choice of
forum and transferring to a more convenient district); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rodano,
493 F. Supp. 954, 955 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (granting the defendant’s motion to transfer to a more
convenient forum in an interpleader case).
167. Burbank, supra note 96, at 205.
168. See Erbsen, supra note 154, at 779; Markowitz & Nash, supra note 67, at 1173.
169. Casad, supra note 42, at 1604 (“In the context of the federal courts and the Fifth
Amendment, it may well be a denial of due process to subject a defendant to jurisdiction in
an unfair or inconvenient forum without institutional protections against that result. That
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matter of constitutional law, this is an open question, at least with
respect to a statute that provides for nationwide service of process
and a defendant “tagged” anywhere in the United States. As a nor-
mative matter, I tend to agree with Kevin Clermont that ultimately,
the Constitution demands some degree of “forum-reasonableness.”170
That is, 
the permissiveness of pure jurisdiction and the malleability of
mere venue do not mean a federal action may lie anywhere—the
constitutional requirement of forum-reasonableness demands
that the particular district be fundamentally fair in light of all
of the interests of the public and the parties concerning the
litigation.171
The twin strands of power and reasonableness will likely remain
with us in our jurisdictional doctrine, but we have gone too far down
the reasonableness road to return to a jurisdictional doctrine based
purely on power. Instead, if the Court’s recent cases are any guide,
we are likely to continue muddling through, with territorial power
as a baseline justification for jurisdiction that requires an assess-
ment of reasonableness to protect against a forum that is so incon-
venient that a party does not have a real opportunity to be heard, or
one which has no legitimate interest in deciding the case before it.
If that remains the case, then a reasonableness assessment—deter-
mined in light of national contacts—must limit congressional
assertions of nationwide jurisdiction.172
problem would emerge, however, only in the unlikely event that Congress actually did repeal
the venue and venue transfer statutes. The denial of due process then would be in the repeal
itself, that is, in taking away the institutional protections that provide reasonable assurance
of a fair forum.”).
170. Clermont, supra note 59, at 438.
171. Id.
172. As a general matter, I agree with Professor Martin Redish, who has advocated a
“revised structure” for assessing reasonableness, taking into account “the degree of inconven-
ience that a defendant would suffer in being forced to litigate in a distant forum, the degree
of inconvenience a plaintiff would suffer in being forced to proceed in a different forum, and
the state’s interest in having its own law resolve the controversy.” See Martin H. Redish, Due
Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV.
1112, 1115 (1981).
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No statute has yet been put to that test in the Supreme Court.
But perhaps the one most likely to do it has been hiding in plain
sight for fifty years: the multidistrict litigation statute.
C. Summary
So where are we in 2018 when it comes to the law of personal
jurisdiction? Much remains in flux. It appears clear that the Court
is engaged in a project of policing plaintiff forum shopping through
the due process restrictions on state court jurisdiction, whether
those restrictions apply in state or federal court, via Rule 4.173 As
the Court reminded us in 2017, it is serious about the “essentially
at home” test for general jurisdiction, and it is equally serious about
preventing expansive notions of specific jurisdiction to permit claims
without a factual connection to the forum state.174 The overall result
is a more rule-based vision of jurisdiction that avoids balancing the
particular circumstances of the parties and the interests of the for-
um state.
Despite the clarity of this general trend, what remains unclear is
the theoretical basis for the Court’s decisions. Despite its many
opportunities in the last six years, the Court has not developed the
basis for its restrictive approach.175 Perhaps this is because, as
Nicastro indicated, there is simply not sufficient agreement among
the Justices on such fundamental questions.176 What is clear is that
the Court is perfectly willing to continue to muddle through. There
is no better example than 2017’s Bristol-Myers opinion.177 Although
the tally of votes, eight-to-one in favor of reversing,178 suggested
consensus on the result, the opinion clarifies almost nothing about
the underpinnings of jurisdictional law. In rejecting California’s as-
sertion of jurisdiction over a nationwide set of claims arising from
the defendant’s allegedly defective drug, the Court cited both con-
cerns about burdens on the defendant and interstate federalism.179
173. See supra Part I.A.
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. See supra Part I.A.
176. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
177. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
178. See id. at 1777.
179. See id. at 1780-81.
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Yet nowhere in the opinion does the Court actually analyze how
these concerns apply to the facts of the case. Rather, as in the other
post-2011 cases, the reader is left wondering exactly what personal
jurisdiction doctrine amounts to, other than an opportunity to police
on an ad hoc basis what the Court considers to be inappropriate
forum shopping.
As a result, despite the flurry of recent activity, we remain in the
dark on the critical questions that have bedeviled jurisdictional
doctrine since the beginning. Do limitations on a state’s jurisdiction
flow from concerns about territorial sovereignty, interstate federal-
ism, fundamental fairness, or some combination of all three? And
what of federal court jurisdiction? Justice Samuel Alito proclaimed
that the limitations on federal court jurisdiction remained open
after Bristol-Myers.180
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
A. The Roots of the Multidistrict Litigation Statute
MDL intentionally skirts limitations on personal jurisdiction, but
to understand how it does that, one has to return to the statute’s
roots. In 1968, when the statute was passed, the concept of limited
transfer for pretrial proceedings was novel.181 It was invented by an
academic, Dean Phil C. Neal of the University of Chicago, and
United States District Judge William H. Becker of the Western
District of Missouri.182 Neal and Judge Becker had served on the
Coordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation, an ad hoc group of
judges assembled by Chief Justice Earl Warren in 1962 to handle
the unprecedented federal antitrust litigation arising out of price
fixing in the electrical equipment industry.183 The electrical equip-
ment scandal spawned over 1900 lawsuits around the country—a
180. See id. at 1783-84.
181. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 837-38.
182. See id. at 854-63.
183. See Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel
Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 623 (1964); Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts (Feb. 7, 1962) (on file with author) (statement of Chief Justice Warren noting creation
of the committee “for the purpose of considering the problems arising from discovery pro-
cedures in multiple litigation filed in different judicial districts but with common witnesses
and exhibits”).
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tidal wave of litigation that threatened to overwhelm the federal
courts.184 The judges on the Coordinating Committee—all of whom
were devoted adherents to the burgeoning philosophy of active case
management by trial judges, particularly in complex cases—invent-
ed a series of measures to handle the deluge, including coordinated
depositions of key witnesses, national document depositories, fast-
tracking cases against the major defendants, and uniform pretrial
orders entered by the district judges around the country assigned to
each of the cases.185 Because the Coordinating Committee had no
real power to enter enforceable orders, the success of its actions
relied on the voluntary cooperation of the judges and lawyers in-
volved in the cases in the courts scattered around the country.186
Although defendants felt railroaded to settlement by the relentless
pace of discovery,187 the Coordinating Committee’s efforts were
tremendously successful at resolving the litigation, in part due to
the judges’ willingness to broker agreements in cases themselves.188
By 1966, the electrical equipment cases were over.189
184. See CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE
DAMAGE ACTIONS 81 (1973) (describing how, by 1962, “the filings for treble damages had
swollen to a torrent”); Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Judicial Conference, The
Impact of the Electrical Anti-Trust Cases upon Federal Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 375, 497
(1965) (Chief Judge Thomas Clary of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noting that “[t]here
were actually 25,632 claims ... involved in these 1912 cases”).
185. See generally Bradt, supra note 7, at 854-63; Neal & Goldberg, supra note 183, at 622-
26.
186. Phil C. Neal, Multi-District Coordination—The Antecedents of § 1407, 13 ANTITRUST
BULL. 99, 101 (1968) (“The Committee was of course operating without statutory or other for-
mal authority. The success of its effort depended entirely upon the willingness of all the
judges responsible for the cases to follow the lead of the Committee.”).
187. See Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class
Action Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1733 (2017) (describing defendants’ displeasure,
including a memorandum by Cravath, Swaine & Moore, which represented defendant West-
inghouse, to the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, complaining that the
“compression of defendants’ discovery and the resulting diminution of their opportunity to
prepare for trial has reached a point in our view where due process is endangered”); see also,
e.g., William M. Sayre, Developments in Multiple Treble Damage Act Litigation-Introduction,
in N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, 1966 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 46, 51 (“The defendants litigated,
but it was all uphill. The courts had little sympathy for their plight, and it must have been
obvious to the courts that their burden would be relieved if enough pressure were put upon
the defendants to force them to settle. And pressure there was.”).
188. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 859.
189. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 5-6 (1969) (“If it had not
been for the monumental effort of the nine judges on [the Coordinating Committee] ... the
district court calendars throughout the country could well have broken down.” (quoting Chief
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The judges on the Coordinating Committee—particularly Judge
Becker and Chief Judge Alfred Murrah of the Tenth Circuit—did
not believe that the electrical equipment cases would be a one-off.190
Rather, electrical equipment was just the beginning of a “litigation
explosion” that would engulf the federal courts as technology devel-
oped, the population expanded, and causes of action proliferated.191
Moreover, although the electrical equipment cases were marked by
extraordinary cooperation by the parties and the courts, it was un-
likely that such voluntary coordination would recur. Defense coun-
sel were aggrieved by the speed of the litigation, and some of the
involved district judges chafed at the Committee’s demands of
uniformity.192 In the Committee’s view, a permanent mechanism
was needed to handle this influx of litigation, so even as the elec-
trical equipment litigation was pending, Judge Becker and Neal (the
Coordinating Committee’s Reporter) began to develop a permanent
statutory solution.193
The core of the drafters’ mission was two-fold: to reconceive the
federal courts as a single national instrument that could cope with
controversies of nationwide scope, and to centralize power over
large, complex cases in the hands of individual judges who would
actively manage the cases to a conclusion.194 The drafters believed
that the traditional decentralization of the federal district courts
and the notion of the passive judge allowing litigants to dictate the
Justice Earl Warren, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (May 16,
1967))); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991,
at 5, 31-32 (“Much legal commentary describes the work of the Committee as successful.”).
190. Bradt, supra note 187, at 1724.
191. To Provide for the Temporary Transfer to a Single District for Coordinated or Con-
solidated Pretrial Proceedings of Civil Actions Pending in Different Districts Which Involve
One or More Common Questions of Fact, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 8276
Before the Fifth Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 26-27 (1966) (state-
ment of C.J. William H. Becker, Western District of Missouri) (“We feel that there is a litiga-
tion explosion occurring in the Federal courts along with the population explosion and the
technological revolution; that even with the addition of many new judges, the caseload, the
backlog of cases pending, is growing; and that some new tools are needed by the judges in
order to process the litigation.”). 
192. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 857.
193. See Bradt, supra note 187, at 1727, 1729 (noting that the Committee “believed that
a mandatory MDL statute would be necessary because the voluntary cooperation and good
will of the parties that facilitated the resolution of the electrical-equipment cases was not
likely to recur”).
194. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 839.
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pace of litigation were outworn concepts ill-equipped for the future
of mass tort litigation.195
The judges’ first idea was a “radical forum non conveniens stat-
ute” that would transfer cases involving a common question of fact
filed in multiple districts to a single federal district judge.196 But
they quickly moved away from that idea for a political reason: the
fear that such a proposal would spawn “massive resistance” from
plaintiffs’ lawyers outside major cities fearful of losing their busi-
ness.197 The more modest measure the drafters settled on was “lim-
ited transfer” for pretrial proceedings with remand to the transferor
court for trial.198 The plaintiffs’ bar, when solicited for comment, was
enthusiastic about this proposal—and understandably so, given the
potential for leveling of the playing field with better-resourced
defense counsel that consolidated litigation would provide.199
Indeed, the biggest concern plaintiffs’ lawyers expressed was the
fear that the limited transfer would change the choice-of-law rules
applicable to their cases, a fear later allayed by the drafters.200
Although the concept of limited transfer for pretrial proceedings
was more modest than the drafters’ original concept, which included
complete transfer for trial, the power granted to the transferee
judge was intended to be substantial.201 Under the proposed scheme,
the district judge would be granted significant discretion to consol-
idate and control discovery.202 Without such strong control, Judge
195. See id. (describing the drafters’ twin aims of unification of the federal courts and
centralization of power to manage cases). As I have detailed, the drafters’ goals in this area
mirrored those of Chief Justice William Howard Taft, who organized the precursor to the Ju-
dicial Conference and sought congressional approval of an ad hoc “flying squadron” of judges
who could hear cases anywhere in the country. See id. at 849 (quoting Judith Resnik & Lane
Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief
Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1617 (2006)); see also JUSTIN CROWE,
BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
199-212 (2012) (summarizing Chief Justice Taft’s efforts facilitating judicial reforms).
196. Bradt, supra note 187, at 1724-25.
197. Bradt, supra note 7, at 871, 874.
198. Id. at 839.
199. See id. at 878.
200. Id.
201. See A Proposal to Provide Pretrial Consolidation of Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings
on S. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 13 (1966) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 3815] (statement of Phil C. Neal,
Dean, University of Chicago Law School); Bradt, supra note 7, at 883.
202. See Hearings on S. 3815, supra note 201, at 48 (statement of Ronald W. Olsen,
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Becker worried that “litigants would run cases,” creating backlog
and delays.203 Moreover, the drafters intended that the MDL judge
would possess all the powers that the judge would have if the case
had not been transferred, including the power to decide dispositive
motions.204 Finally, the judges responsible for the MDL statute
considered it crucial that, unlike under the proposed Rule 23(b)(3),
the tort class action rule being considered by the Civil Rules Ad-
visory Committee, there could be no right for any party to opt out of
consolidated proceedings.205
One problem the drafters faced in developing the statute was that
the transferee forum might not be an acceptable forum for many of
the cases transferred there for pretrial proceedings, whether due to
the lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant or a violation of
the venue statutes.206 Indeed, one reason the drafters believed that
a new statute was necessary was because the general transfer stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), limited transfers to districts in which the
case might have been brought—meaning that transfer could not be
to an otherwise improper venue.207 During the electrical equipment
litigation, the judges employed normal 1404(a) transfers in order to
place all matters involving a single defendant before a single district
judge, but the choices were limited because that judge had to be one
who had jurisdiction in all of the transferred cases.208 One goal of
the drafters of the MDL statute was to ensure that in cases of
national scope, pretrial proceedings could be centralized before a
single judge without foisting on that judge the potential burden of
Esquire).
203. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 878.
204. See id. at 878-79.
205. See Bradt, supra note 187, at 1727-31 (describing the attempts by the Coordinating
Committee to convince the reporters of the Civil Rules Committee to excise the opt-out right
from proposed Rule 23). 
206. See id. at 1724-25.
207. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1960) (holding that the language, “might
have been brought,” in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) refers to the plaintiff ’s right, independent of the
defendant’s wishes, to sue in a particular district).
208. See Bradt, supra note 187, at 1733-34 (describing the transfer of all cases involving
defendant I-T-E Circuit Breaker to a federal court in Chicago). See generally 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (2012).
1204 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1165
trying all of the cases.209 The solution was transfer for pretrial
proceedings in a single district with eventual remand for trial.210
Substantively, there was no discussion among the drafters—or
the Congress—about whether there were due process-based limita-
tions on the location of the transferee district. Instead, discussions
focused primarily on venue and the need for Congress to create the
transfer mechanism due to its traditional control of that subject.211
There was no substantive debate over whether the proposal pre-
sented constitutional problems—rather, the drafters seemed to sim-
ply assume that Congress controlled venue in the federal courts and
could legislate as it pleased. In context, the drafters’ lack of concern
with personal jurisdiction may have been unremarkable in the mid-
1960s, when “doing business jurisdiction” was thought to be expan-
sive.212 In cases of nationwide scope involving defendants operating
throughout the country, personal jurisdiction may have been
thought to be a smaller problem than venue statutes, which could
impose stricter requirements. Moreover, the drafters apparently
believed that the provision for trial in the district in which the case
was filed—a district that would have to have proper jurisdiction
over the defendant—would be sufficient to address jurisdictional
concerns, as they would explain in their case law, outlined below. In
any event, the jurisdictional issue appears not to have troubled
anyone, particularly the statute’s primary congressional advocate,
Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland, the only senator who attended
the hearings on the bill, which finally passed in 1968.213
209. See Hearings on S. 3815, supra note 201, at 13 (statement of Phil C. Neal, Dean,
University of Chicago Law School).
210. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 871.
211. See id. at 870-72 (describing the drafters’ concerns that their proposal was beyond the
rulemaking powers granted under the Rules Enabling Act).
212. See Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business
Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 675 (2012) (“[L]ower courts widely embraced the notion that
any corporation ‘doing business’ in a state was subject to general jurisdiction there.”).
213. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 891-92 (describing the dynamic of the Senate hearings and
noting that Tydings was the only Senator in attendance); id. at 906 (noting the passage of the
bill).
2018] LONG ARM OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1205
B. How Multidistrict Litigation Works in Theory and in Practice
The MDL statute is deceptively simple, but practice under the
statute, as it has developed over the last fifty years, is specialized
and complicated.214 The animating mechanism in the statute is the
provision for transfer of cases “involving one or more common ques-
tions of fact ... pending in different districts” to “any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”215 The only limita-
tion on the power to transfer is that it be “for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and ... promote the just and efficient conduct
of such actions.”216 After the MDL has been established, later-filed
cases involving the same subject matter are rather seamlessly
transferred to the MDL as tagalong cases.217
Once pretrial proceedings conclude, the cases must be remanded
to the districts from which they were transferred.218 The statute
provides that the decision to transfer—and the determination of the
transferee judge—be made by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, a group of seven judges appointed by the Chief Justice of
the United States.219 Decisions by the Panel to transfer may be
reviewed only by extraordinary writ; decisions to deny transfer may
not be reviewed at all.220 In my research, I have not turned up a
single instance of a reversal of a decision by the JPML to create an
MDL.221
214. See, e.g., Burch, supra note 11, at 78 (describing the complexity of modern MDL prac-
tice); Myriam Gilles, Comment, Tribal Rituals of the MDL: A Comment on Williams, Lee, and
Borden, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 173, 176-77 (2012).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
216. Id.
217. See Bradt, supra note 91, at 787. 
218. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1998)
(discussing mandatory remand at the close of pretrial proceedings).
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b), (d). For further background on the Panel, see generally John G.
Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225 (2008).
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e).
221. The only known instance of mandamus being granted against the Panel involved its
decision to remand cases prematurely. See In re Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor Standards Act
“Effective Scheduling” Litig., 73 F.3d 528, 532-33, 532 n.10 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 2 LAURA
E. ELLSWORTH ET AL., BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 14.26 (4th
ed. 2016); Paul M. Janicke, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Now a Strength-
ened Traffic Cop for Patent Venue, 32 REV. LITIGATION 497, 512 (2013) (noting the rarity of
mandamus against the Panel).
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During pretrial proceedings, the MDL judge possesses plenary
power over the litigation, including the power to manage discovery,
dismiss cases, exclude evidence, grant summary judgment, certify
a class action, and sanction parties.222 Pretty much the only thing
the MDL judge may not do is transfer a case to herself for trial, a
formerly accepted practice rejected in 1998 by the Supreme Court.223
In theory, then, the MDL scheme is straightforward: related cases
around the country are transferred temporarily to a single court,
which conducts coordinated pretrial proceedings and then transfers
them home for trial. The reality of MDL practice, as everyone
understands, is that the cases almost never exit the MDL proceed-
ing. They are almost always—in fact, over 97 percent of the
time—resolved in the MDL court, either by dispositive motion or
through mass-settlement agreement.224
The animating feature of MDL is that it is a procedural hybrid,
combining aspects of individual and group litigation.225 But, to be
more specific, what is special about MDL is that the purported
individuality of the cases within the group provides cover to treating
them as a mass. In theory, the cases within the MDL retain their
individual identities.226 Individual plaintiffs file their own cases and
hire their own lawyers. Transfer into an MDL is not supposed to
change the choice-of-law rules applicable to a state law claim.227 And
each plaintiff ultimately retains the right to decide whether to
222. See 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 151, § 3866 (“The transferee judge inherits the entire
pretrial jurisdiction that the transferor court could have exercised.”).
223. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 28, 40.
224. See Burch, supra note 5, at 72 (“Even though the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation ... centralizes factually related cases to promote efficient pretrial handling only, the
reality is that just 2.9 percent of cases return to their original districts.” (footnote omitted)).
225. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 215
(characterizing a “quasi-class action,” such as an MDL, as a combination of public and private
ordering); Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1105, 1113-14 (2010) (describing “hybridization” as a “combination of individual actions
with some manner of centralizing mechanism”).
226. See In re Korean Air Lines Co., 642 F.3d 685, 700 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Within the context
of MDL proceedings, individual cases that are consolidated or coordinated for pretrial
purposes remain fundamentally separate actions, intended to resume their independent
status once the pretrial stage of litigation is over.”).
227. Bradt, supra note 91, at 794 (explaining that in MDL “each case retains its choice-of-
law identity, and plaintiffs are not faced with the choice of trading the law to which they
would otherwise be entitled for the benefits of aggregation”).
2018] LONG ARM OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1207
accept a proposed settlement agreement or go to trial in the district
in which he filed his case.228
But in other practical ways, MDL is really an aggressively
consolidated litigation. Plaintiffs of course have no choice as to
whether their case will be included in an MDL, and they have no
opportunity to opt out.229 And once an MDL is established, the cases
are prosecuted by a “steering committee” of lead lawyers selected by
the MDL judge—often lawyers who have served in such a role in
other MDL cases, perhaps before that judge.230 The ultimate success
of plaintiffs’ cases—or the value of their settlements—is mostly
determined by the conduct of these lawyers, over whom any
individual plaintiff has little control.231 As practice has developed,
settlements in MDL cases now include numerous provisions that
incentivize individual plaintiffs to accept them—such as the
provision in the settlement of the Vioxx cases requiring lawyers to
inform plaintiffs that they would have to get a new lawyer if they
declined the settlement.232
Altogether, MDL is a tightly packaged set of individual cases that
are really litigated as a group. But the doctrine underlying MDL
often underplays the aggregate nature of the proceeding. Consider
that in a damages class action, there are rule-based requirements
to ensure class members are adequately represented and have the
right to opt out.233 In an MDL, those requirements do not exist
because plaintiffs are thought to have opted in to litigating by filing
their cases and to be adequately represented because they chose
their own lawyers.234 Moreover, because plaintiffs retain the ulti-
mate choice to go to trial in the forum of their choice, the MDL
process is thought to be modest and limited. Critics of MDL see this
228. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 12, at 1271.
229. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
230. See Burch, supra note 11, at 73 (“[J]udges appoint steering committees and other lead
lawyers to conduct discovery, disseminate information, draft motions, negotiate settlements,
and try bellwether cases.”); Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty
and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 525.
231. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 131-35 (2010).
232. See Rave, supra note 26, at 2196 & n.102.
233. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), (b)(3).
234. See Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
389, 391 (2011) (describing MDL as having “stripped away” the protections of the class action
rules).
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patina of modesty as a ruse, little more than an end run around the
protections thought to be necessary in class actions, and potentially
as a violation of due process.235
While it is difficult to paint with a broad brush to determine
whether individual litigants are better or worse off in an MDL,
there is one aspect of MDL that is clear, and which its creators
understood well: its split personality as a temporary collection of
individual cases and a tightly consolidated unitary proceeding are
the key to its success. The formal nature of MDL insulates it from
the kinds of due process attacks that doomed the mass tort class
action.236 Instead, MDL’s ability to characterize itself as modest and
limited facilitates the aggressiveness of the transfer. The fact that
remand for trial is a formally guaranteed possibility makes the
power consolidated in the hands of the MDL judge salable. Personal
jurisdiction is a prime example of how MDL does this and how
courts oscillate between individual and group treatment of cases. I
will now turn to a discussion of the remarkably cursory and under-
developed law of personal jurisdiction in both the JPML and the
federal courts.
C. Personal Jurisdiction in Multidistrict Litigation
It was not long after the creation of the MDL statute that the
JPML had to deal with personal jurisdiction problems and set the
stage for courts’ cursory treatment of all jurisdiction-related matters
thereafter. It is worth lingering over the opinions in the cases
because they sowed the seeds of current confusion and showed how
MDL has its cake and eats it, too, when it comes to jurisdiction. 
In 1969, one of the first MDLs involved antitrust claims arising
out of alleged price fixing in the children’s schoolbook industry.237
Some nineteen cases were transferred by the JPML to the Eastern
District of Illinois.238 Among the cases to be transferred was an
235. See Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Reso-
lution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 552 (2013); Redish & Karaba, supra note 53, at 111 (describing
MDL as “something of a cross between the Wild West, twentieth-century political smoke-filled
rooms, and the Godfather movies”).
236. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627-28 (1997) (concluding that
the class did not satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement).
237. In re Library Editions of Children’s Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1140 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
238. In fact, the schoolbook cases were among those informally consolidated by the Coord-
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action brought in California federal court by the County of Los
Angeles against numerous publishers.239 The County resisted the
transfer on the ground that several of the defendants had not yet
been served with process.240 Although those defendants ultimately
were served, it created a question of first impression for the Panel:
whether it could order a transfer of a case in which at least some of
the defendants had not yet been served.241 The Panel concluded that
it could do so, relying on the Supreme Court’s 1962 opinion in
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman.242 Goldlawr—rather cursorily, in its own
right—held that a federal district court without personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant could effect a transfer to a district with per-
sonal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).243 This statute provides
that a district court “in which is filed a case laying venue in the
wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it
could have been brought.”244 The Court concluded that the legisla-
tive scheme required transfer under such circumstances to ensure
that plaintiffs were not prejudiced by erroneously suing in the
wrong district and potentially losing their claims due to the running
of the statute of limitations.245
inating Committee on Multidistrict Litigation—without any statutory authority—before the
MDL statute was passed. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 863, 899 (noting that the schoolbook
cases were among those informally supervised by the Coordinating Committee, without any
express authorization); Neal, supra note 186, at 104 (noting that “the Committee had taken
under its wing several other sets of cases”).
239. See In re Library Editions, 299 F. Supp. at 1140.
240. Id. at 1140-41.
241. Id. at 1141.
242. Id. at 1141-42 (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962)).
243. See Goldlwar, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465-67 (1962).
244. Id. at 465 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)).
245. See id. at 466. In his brief, breezy opinion for a five-to-two Court, over a dissent by
Justice John Marshall Harlan (always a bad sign), Justice Hugo Black contended that the
transferring court need not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the
Congress sought to avoid “the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal
of their actions merely because they had made an erroneous guess with regard to the
existence of some elusive fact of the kind upon which venue provisions often turn.” Id. at 465-
66. Justice Black concluded that filing in a district not only should be no bar to transfer but
should also toll the statute of limitations, on the ground that “filing shows a desire on the part
of the plaintiff to begin his case and thereby ... shows the proper diligence on the part of the
plaintiff which such statutes of limitation were intended to insure.” Id. at 467. Justice Harlan
was skeptical, correctly noting that the legislative history did not support this conclusion. See
id. at 468 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The JPML extrapolated from Goldlawr the principle that “the
power of the Panel and the courts to effectuate a transfer under
§ 1407 is not vitiated by the transferor court’s lack of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.”246 But the JPML’s decision emphati-
cally does not stand for the proposition that proper jurisdiction in
the transferor court is unnecessary. It in fact goes no further than
Goldlawr: although the defendants need not have been served
before a transfer, the defendant still had to be amenable to process
in the transferor court. The Panel explained:
A § 1407 transfer will not deprive an unserved defendant of any
right which is entitled to judicial protection. Congress, possess-
ing nationwide sovereignty and plenary power over the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts, has given no indication that, in
creating § 1407, it intended to expand the territorial limits of
effective service. Therefore, proper service must still be made on
each defendant pursuant to the rules of the transferor court
even after a transfer under § 1407. Additionally, any party
served with process after such a transfer may raise any and all
motions available to a defendant properly served before
transfer.247
The basis for the Court’s holding is straightforward: if lack of
service prevented a transfer, it would create delays in the consolida-
tion sought by the MDL statute.248 Because the statute provides that
the defendant will be notified of the transfer and have the opportu-
nity to challenge the personal jurisdiction of the transferor court in
the MDL court, there is no prejudice to the defendant in ordering
transfer prior to effective service.249
246. In re Library Editions, 299 F. Supp. at 1142. The exercise of power by a federal court
lacking personal jurisdiction in Goldlawr is a far cry from what is authorized by the MDL
statute. In Goldlawr, the Court held that § 1406(a) required a court without jurisdiction to
dismiss or transfer the case to a court with jurisdiction, see Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 465-
67—action far different from an MDL court without jurisdiction, which can take control of the
litigation of a case and enter a final judgment against a plaintiff or a defendant. In a sense,
then, while Goldlawr mitigates personal jurisdiction concerns, MDL exacerbates them. To say
that Goldlawr authorizes MDL is an extraordinary leap. 
247. In re Library Editions, 299 F. Supp. at 1142.
248. See id.
249. See id. (“An unserved defendant ... will have ample opportunity to object to the trans-
fer.”); In re Gypsum Wallboard, 302 F. Supp. 794, 794 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (per curiam) (“Motions
to quash service or dismiss for lack of jurisdiction are being routinely considered by courts to
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In re Library Editions therefore stands only for the proposition
that the MDL statute allows for transfer prior to effective service,
but not for the proposition that the MDL statute creates nationwide
jurisdiction or overrides limitations on jurisdiction that would other-
wise apply. Despite regularly being cited as such, it emphatically
does not stand for the proposition that the MDL statute authorizes
nationwide personal jurisdiction. Nor could it. There is no “long-
arm” provision of the MDL statute authorizing nationwide service
of process.250 And Goldlawr, on which Library Editions solely relies,
does not stand for the proposition that a federal court may transfer
a case, even under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, from a district court without
personal jurisdiction to another district court without personal
jurisdiction. Library Editions therefore does not provide any cover
for a conclusion that the MDL court can exercise any jurisdiction
that the transferor court could not.
Twice in its early years of existence, the JPML considered the
question of whether the MDL transferee court must have personal
jurisdiction over the defendants. In both cases, it baldly stated,
without explanation or citation, that there were no jurisdiction-
based limitations on transfer. For instance, in In re Kauffman
Mutual Fund Actions, the Panel responded to defendants’ conten-
tion that the MDL court did not possess jurisdiction over the defend-
ants by stating only that “the fact that defendants may not all be
amenable to suit in the same jurisdiction does not prevent their
transfer to a single district for pretrial proceedings.”251 Four years
later, in 1976, the Panel returned to the question in In re Sugar
Industry Antitrust Litigation.252 In Sugar Industry, several East
Coast based defendants in a case filed in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania objected on personal jurisdiction grounds to transfer
which multidistrict litigation has previously been transferred and we see no good reason why
[the defendant] can not [sic] pursue its remedies following transfer.” (footnote omitted)); see
also Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and
Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 576 (1978) (“Lack of personal jurisdiction, however, is not
grounds for opposing transfer because any party contesting personal jurisdiction can make
the appropriate motion before the transferee court.”).
250. See Monaghan, supra note 34, at 1189 n.194 (“There is no suggestion that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 itself can be read, in effect, to authorize nationwide in personam jurisdiction in the
MDL transferee court, even if the transferor court itself lacked personal jurisdiction.”).
251. 337 F. Supp. 1337, 1339 (J.P.M.L. 1972) (per curiam).
252. 399 F. Supp. 1397 (J.P.M.L. 1975) (per curiam).
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for pretrial proceedings across the country in the Northern District
of California, where they allegedly had no contacts.253 The Panel
rejected the defendants’ argument, stating only, and again without
citation, that “[w]e have considered this constitutional argument
and find it without merit.”254
The JPML’s last word on personal jurisdiction—and its most cited
opinion on the subject—is In re FMC Corp. Patent Litigation,
decided in 1976.255 In FMC, a defendant, Jenkins Equipment Corp.,
resisted pretrial transfer to the District of Kansas on the ground
that he was not subject to personal jurisdiction there.256 Jenkins
reasoned that this would render the District of Kansas an inappro-
priate MDL forum because, lacking jurisdiction, the court could not
enforce discovery orders against it.257 Again, the JPML rejected the
argument, holding that “Jenkins’s contentions regarding jurisdiction
and venue are based on a total misconception of Section 1407.
Transfers under Section 1407 are simply not encumbered by con-
siderations of in personam jurisdiction and venue.”258 The Panel
continued: “A transfer under Section 1407 is, in essence, a change
of venue for pretrial purposes. Following a transfer, the transferee
judge has all the jurisdiction and powers over pretrial proceedings
in the actions transferred to him that the transferor judge would
have in the absence of transfer.”259 FMC, of course, only begs the
question. Saying that the orders are enforceable presumes that
jurisdiction exists; to say that the orders are enforceable and there-
fore jurisdiction is available gets it precisely backwards.
Overall, despite the Panel’s lack of analysis on jurisdictional
questions, Library Editions, Sugar Industry, and FMC remain the
fonts of wisdom on the jurisdictional scheme of MDL. Together, they
stand for the following propositions. The MDL statute does not
expand the jurisdiction of the federal district courts because any
challenge to the jurisdiction of the transferor court is available in
the MDL court.260 The jurisdiction of the MDL court is irrelevant
253. See id. at 1398-1400.
254. Id. at 1400.
255. 422 F. Supp. 1163 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (per curiam).
256. Id. at 1165.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. (citing In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 483, 495-96 (J.P.M.L. 1968)).
260. See In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 187, 208 (D.
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because it is only a change of venue for pretrial purposes, and the
MDL court’s jurisdiction is only derivative of the transferor court’s
jurisdiction.261 Challenges to the jurisdiction of the MDL court are
therefore unavailable. In short, the JPML has uniformly held that
“[t]he fact that defendants may not all be amenable to suit in the
same jurisdiction does not prevent transfer of the actions against
them to a single district for pretrial proceedings where the prerequi-
sites of Section 1407 are otherwise satisfied.”262
Federal courts have only added to the confusion. Perhaps the best
example is a Second Circuit opinion in the Agent Orange litiga-
tion.263 In that case, several members of the plaintiff class contended
that the MDL court could not assert personal jurisdiction over them
due to a lack of minimum contacts.264 Citing Sugar Industry and
FMC, the Second Circuit dismissed the argument.265 But its analysis
was at least curious. Ignoring Library Editions, the Second Circuit
asserted that the MDL statute did provide for nationwide personal
jurisdiction, stating that “Congress may, consistent with the due
process clause, enact legislation authorizing the federal courts to
exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction. One such piece of legisla-
tion is ... the multidistrict litigation statute.”266 In related litigation,
when asked to reconsider, the Second Circuit again rejected person-
al jurisdiction arguments in MDL as “frivolous.”267 The Sixth Circuit
Mass. 2004) (“Service must be valid under the law of the transferor states.”); In re Telectronics
Pacing Sys., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 909, 914 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (“[T]his Court can only exercise
jurisdiction over the Australian Defendants in individual cases where the transferor court
could exercise jurisdiction over the Australian Defendants.”); Maricopa County v. Am.
Petrofina, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 467, 469 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (“[T]he transferee court may by its
process obtain jurisdiction over persons to the same extent as could the court of original
jurisdiction. I do not intimate that the jurisdiction of the court where the case is originally
filed could be expanded by the use of the present multidistrict litigation statute.” (citation
omitted)).
261. See 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 151, § 3866. (“A party who is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in the original court cannot be validly served in the transferee district.”).
262. In re Falstaff Brewing Corp. Antitrust Litig., 434 F. Supp. 1225, 1229 (J.P.M.L. 1977)
(per curiam) (citing In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 337 F. Supp. 1337, 1339 (J.P.M.L.
1972)).
263. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
264. See id. at 163.
265. See id.
266. Id. (citation omitted).
267. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1432 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing In
re “Agent Orange,” 818 F.2d at 163).
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recently echoed this conclusion in an unpublished opinion, calling
the argument that there are limitations on the MDL court’s
jurisdiction “meritless.”268
In sum, the JPML and the federal courts have essentially allowed
MDL to have its cake and eat it, too. The JPML proclaims that MDL
does not provide for nationwide personal jurisdiction or expand the
scope of service of process in federal cases because temporary
transfer to an MDL does not affect any party’s substantive rights.269
But the Second and Sixth Circuits have held that MDL is insulated
from any due process attack on the ground that the MDL statute
does provide for nationwide personal jurisdiction and therefore is
unlimited, even though it does effectively expand the jurisdiction of
the federal courts far beyond what would be available absent
MDL.270
The opinions of the Second and Sixth Circuit are imprecise, but
they are not implausible. They may actually be more realistic than
those by the JPML. But the circuit courts have it wrong because
Congress did not authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction in
MDL—it only authorized limited transfer from a court with personal
jurisdiction.271 One cannot file a case directly in an MDL court if it
does not possess a valid basis for jurisdiction; the case has to be filed
in a proper forum and then transferred.272 And, as the Supreme
Court has stated on multiple occasions—including as recently as
last term—service of a summons is a prerequisite for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.273 But the Second and Sixth Circuits, despite
being wrong, are more honest about what MDL actually does. The
268. Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 2010 WL 2545586, at *5 (6th Cir. June 16, 2010)
(referring to the MDL statute as providing “nationwide personal jurisdiction” (quoting In re
“Agent Orange,” 818 F.2d at 163)).
269. See In re Library Editions of Children’s Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (J.P.M.L.
1969).
270. See Howard, 2010 WL 2545586, at *5; see also In re “Agent Orange,” 818 F.2d at 163.
271. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
272. See Bradt, supra note 91, at 763.
273. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1555-56 (2017) (“Congress’ typical mode of
providing for the exercise of personal jurisdiction has been to authorize service of process.
Congress uses this terminology because, absent consent, a basis for service of a summons on
the defendant is prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” (citations omitted));
Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (“Before a federal court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of
summons must be satisfied.”).
2018] LONG ARM OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1215
JPML’s insistence that the parties’ rights are not affected by limited
transfer is hard to maintain once one understands that all of the
real action in the litigation occurs in the MDL court and that cases
are rarely remanded for trial. Pegging the power of the MDL court
to act as it does—including the power to grant dispositive motions
—on the jurisdiction of the transferor court ignores reality.
Recognizing that the MDL statute really does effectuate a kind of
nationwide jurisdiction, albeit an unusual one, does not end the
inquiry, though, as the Second Circuit assumed that it did.274 It
merely poses the next question: whether the MDL statute is
constitutional, or, at least whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment demands any limitations on how the MDL statute
works. From the JPML’s perspective, the answer is no: it does not
consider personal jurisdiction a factor when deciding where to trans-
fer a case.275
When assigning cases to a transferee judge, the JPML gives a
variety of reasons.276 What matters in one case may not matter in
another. What one can say about JPML transfer orders is that they
seem to give decent, practical reasons for choosing the transferee
court and judge.277 But it is also fair to say that those reasons vary
considerably. For instance, sometimes the location of the defen-
dant’s headquarters matters a great deal,278 while in other cases it
does not.279 And in some cases, the experience of the MDL judge is
274. See In re “Agent Orange,” 818 F.2d at 163.
275. In re Truck Accident Near Alamagordo, N.M. on June 18, 1969, 387 F. Supp. 732, 734
(J.P.M.L. 1975) (per curiam) (“[T]he propriety of in personam jurisdiction in a proposed
transferee district is not a criterion in considering transfer of actions to that district under
Section 1407.”).
276. For a well-done summary, see Daniel A. Richards, Note, An Analysis of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s Selection of Transferee District and Judge, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 311 (2009); see also Heyburn, supra note 219, at 2239-40 (summarizing criteria for
transferee district).
277. See Heyburn, supra note 219, at 2239-40.
278. See, e.g., In re Rust-oleum Restore Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 84 F.
Supp. 3d 1383, 1384 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (noting that defendant “has its corporate headquarters
[in the MDL district], indicating that relevant documents and witnesses likely will be located
there”); In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2010)
(describing “nexus” of litigation to the state of defendant’s headquarters).
279. See, e.g., In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d
1378, 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (assigning MDL to the Eastern District of Missouri because it “is
relatively convenient for defendants, which are located in Toronto, Canada”); In re Anthem,
Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 1365 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (noting
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a critical factor,280 while in other cases the JPML embraces the
opportunity to send the case to a judge who has never overseen an
MDL.281 In some cases, the fact that the transferee judge is already
presiding over some of the component cases is important,282 while in
others the JPML assigns the MDL to a judge who is not hearing any
pending cases.283 In some cases it matters that the parties have
agreed to an MDL district,284 while in others the JPML chooses a
judge that no party has proposed.285 And sometimes the JPML
chooses the busiest federal districts, citing their significant re-
sources,286 while other times it chooses a less busy district whose
favorable docket conditions give it the bandwidth to take on an MDL
case.287 You get the picture.
that although defendant was headquartered in Indiana it had “significant ties” to the MDL
forum in California); In re Natrol, Inc., Glucosamine/Chondroitin Mktg. & Sales Practices
Litig., 26 F. Supp. 3d 1392, 1394 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (transferring MDL involving California-
based defendant to District of Maryland because of the experience of the MDL judge).
280. See In re Coca-Cola Prods. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1386, 1388
(J.P.M.L. 2014) (noting that the chosen judge was “well-versed in the nuances of multidistrict
litigation”).
281. See In re TD Bank, N.A., Debit Card Overdraft Fee Litig., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1378, 1379
(J.P.M.L. 2015) (selecting District of South Carolina in part because “centralization in this
district provides us the opportunity to assign the litigation to a capable jurist who has not
presided over an MDL yet”).
282. See In re Caterpillar, Inc., C13 & C15 Engine Prods. Liab. Litig., 26 F. Supp. 3d 1394,
1395 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (assigning MDL to the District of New Jersey because “[t]he action
pending [there] is also relatively advanced, with discovery already begun”).
283. See In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., 122 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1377 (J.P.M.L.
2015) (assigning to the District of Arizona, where no action was currently pending).
284. In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Salespractices & Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.
III), 997 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (noting that the District of South Carolina
is “the first choice of most plaintiffs, and is also agreeable to” the defendant headquartered
in New York).
285. See In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 949 F. Supp. 2d
1369, 1370 (J.P.M.L. 2013) (selecting Eastern District of Wisconsin even though all parties
supported transfer to Northern District of Illinois); In re Biomet M2A Magnum Hip Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1340 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (assigning MDL to the
Northern District of Indiana “even though no party suggested it and no plaintiff has yet filed
a case there”).
286. See In re Kind LLC “All Natural” Litig., 118 F. Supp. 3d 1380, 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2015)
(citing the “judicial resourses and expertise” of the Southern District of New York); In re
Caterpillar, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 1395 (the District of New Jersey has “the resources to devote
to this litigation”).
287. See In re Lumber Liquidators Chinese-Manufactured Flooring Prods. Mktg., Sales
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1382, 1383 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (“Centralization
in the Eastern District of Virginia allows us to assign this litigation to a district to which we
have transferred relatively few MDLs.”); In re Horizon Organic Milk Plus DHA Omega-3
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My point here is not to say that the JPML’s decisions are
arbitrary, or even that the Panel is doing a poor job. Its decisions
typically make rough-and-ready sense. And, undoubtedly, their task
is complicated by the fact that no district or judge can have an MDL
foisted on it—the judge must, in the Panel’s words, be “willing and
able” to take on the assignment.288 What one can take away from the
JPML’s activities is that Elizabeth Cabraser’s quote that opens this
Article—that when the MDL judge is chosen, what matters is not
where, but whom—is undoubtedly right. The JPML has a menu of
justifications it can use when choosing a transferee district. It is not
readily apparent which ones will be dispositive in any given case,
and geography is not always a central factor.
In MDLs that are destined to be the sort of nationwide mass torts
that now dominate the docket, the JPML will often readily admit
that no single district has a particularly strong connection.289 When
products are marketed and sold nationwide, there is not an obvious
choice for transferee district. For instance, the Panel has candidly
admitted, in a case eventually destined for the District of South Car-
olina, that “almost any district would be an appropriate forum.”290
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (ordering
centralization in the Southern District of Florida that “is presiding over fewer MDL dockets
than other proposed districts”); In re Groupon, Inc., Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 787 F.
Supp. 2d 1362, 1364 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (noting the Southern District of California as “a
relatively underutilized transferee district ... [with] caseload conditions conducive to steering
this litigation on a prudent course”); In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (choosing the Northern District
of Texas because of its “favorable docket conditions”).
288. In re Dial Complete Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 1381
(J.P.M.L. 2011) (transferring to the District Court of New Hampshire on grounds that the
judge “is willing and able to accept the assignment”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (2012)
(requiring “consent of the transferee district court”); Heyburn, supra note 219, at 2240 (“The
willingness and motivation of a particular judge to handle an MDL docket are ultimately the
true keys to whether centralization will benefit the parties and the judicial system.”). 
289. See Heyburn, supra note 219, at 2239 & n.73 (“[L]ocation may be less of an overriding
consideration, particularly where the litigation lacks a singular geographical focal point.”).
290. In re Pella Corp. Architect & Designer Series Windows Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.
Liab. Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 1383 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (“This litigation is nationwide in
scope, and thus almost any district would be an appropriate forum.”); see also In re Takata
Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., 84 F. Supp. 3d 1371, 1372 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (“The litigation is nation-
wide in scope.... No one district stands out as the geographic focal point.”); In re Actos Prods.
Liab. Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1356-57 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (choosing the Western District of
Louisiana when “allegations in this nationwide litigation do not have a strong connection to
any particular district, and related actions are pending in numerous districts across the
country”).
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While sometimes the JPML chooses a district in the defendant’s
home state, or near it,291 this is not always the case. In such cases,
the Panel will often choose based on the judge’s experience, docket
conditions, and accessibility of the court.292 Indeed, it is difficult to
argue with the JPML’s reasoning in placing an MDL in the Western
District of Missouri, a “geographically central location accessible to
the parties ranging from California to Florida.”293 Ultimately, when
it comes to a nationwide tort case, the JPML is catholic in its views
on the accessibility of a forum, sometimes preferring a spot toward
291. See In re McCormick & Co., Inc. Pepper Prods. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.
Supp. 3d 1364, 1366 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (choosing District of Columbia as the transferee forum
in part because the defendant “is based near Baltimore, Maryland, so relevant documents and
witnesses likely will be found there”).
292. In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1402, 1405 (J.P.M.L.
2014) (noting the Eastern District of Louisiana as a “geographically central forum” and Judge
Eldon E. Fallon as “an experienced transferee judge with the willingness and ability to man-
age this litigation efficiently”); In re Actos, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1357 (“[C]entralization in the
Western District of Louisiana permits the Panel to assign the litigation to an experienced
judge who sits in a district in which no other multidistrict litigation is pending.”).
293. In re Simply Orange Orange Juice Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 867 F. Supp. 2d
1344, 1345 (J.P.M.L. 2012).
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the middle of the country due to its central location,294 and other
times a metropolitan coastal location due to its accessibility.295
294. Among the districts referred to as geographically central for nationwide tort litigation
are: the Northern District of Illinois, see, e.g., In re Walgreens Herbal Supplements Mktg. &
Sales Practices Litig., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1373, 1376 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (“This district provides a
convenient and accessible forum for actions filed throughout the country.”); the Northern
District of Indiana, see, e.g., In re Med. Informatics Eng’g, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1381, 1382 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (“[This district] presents a convenient and
accessible forum.”); the District of Kansas, see, e.g., In re Power Morcellator Prods. Liab.
Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1354 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (“This district is centrally located and easily
accessible.”); the Eastern District of Kentucky, see, e.g., In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxy-
phene Prods. Liab. Litig., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (“The Covington division
is accessible to parties outside Kentucky.”); the Eastern District of Louisiana, see, e.g., In re
Xarelto, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 1405 (“This district provides a geographically central forum.”); the
District of Minnesota, see, e.g., In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig.,
49 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1350 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (“[T]his district provides a geographically central
location.”); the Eastern District of Missouri, see, e.g., In re Ashley Madison Customer Data
Sec. Breach Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1378, 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (“This district is a geograph-
ically central and accessible forum for this nationwide litigation.”); the Northern District of
Ohio, see, e.g., In re Anheuser-Busch Beer Labeling Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 949 F.
Supp. 2d 1371, 1372 (J.P.M.L. 2013) (“This district provides a geographically central forum.”);
the Southern District of Ohio, see, e.g., In re Porsche Cars N.A., Inc., Plastic Coolant Tubes
Prods. Liab. Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1349 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (“[T]his district is geographic-
ally centrally located.”); the Northern District of Texas, see, e.g., In re DePuy Orthopaedics,
Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360 (J.P.M.L. 2011)
(“[This district is] geographically central and accessible.”); and the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, see, e.g., In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 949 F.
Supp. 2d 1369, 1370 (J.P.M.L. 2013) (“This district provides a geographically central forum.”).
295. Among the coastal locations chosen have been: the Central District of California, see,
e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Prods. Liab. Litig., 908 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1364 (J.P.M.L.
2012) (“The Central District of California is ... accessible.”); the Southern District of Cali-
fornia, see, e.g., In re Groupon, Inc., Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1364
(J.P.M.L. 2011) (“[This district] is located in an accessible metropolitan area.”); the District
of Columbia, see, e.g., In re McCormick, 148 F. Supp. 3d at 1366 (“The ... District of Columbia
... offers a relatively convenient and accessible transferee forum for all parties.”); the Southern
District of Florida, see, e.g., In re Enfamil Lipil Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 764 F. Supp.
2d 1356, 1357 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (“[T]his district offers a readily accessible transferee forum.”);
the Northern District of Georgia, see, e.g., In re Home Depot, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1398, 1400 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (“[This] district is easily accessible for the
parties in this litigation, which is nationwide in scope.”); the District of Massachusetts, see,
e.g., In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., 138 F. Supp. 3d 1381, 1382 (J.P.M.L. 2015)
(“Boston, Massachusetts, provides an easily accessible district for the parties.”); the District
of New Jersey, see, e.g., In re Caterpillar, Inc., C13 & C15 Engine Prods. Liab. Litig., 26 F.
Supp. 3d 1394, 1395 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (“This district ... is a convenient and accessible forum.”);
and the Southern District of New York, see, e.g., In re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 938 F.
Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 (J.P.M.L. 2013) (“This district ... will be easily accessible for this
nationwide litigation.”).
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What emerges from the transfer orders is that the JPML is acting
pragmatically. The normal concerns of the underlying limitations on
personal jurisdiction rarely loom large. Plaintiffs are likely to be
scattered around the country. And often, particularly in MDLs that
confront an entire industry, there are multiple defendants head-
quartered in different states and acting in multiple states. The
reality is that in order to bring all of these parties into a single
forum for centralized management—as the drafters of the statute
intended—considerations of convenience for any single party must
take a backseat. But to recognize that the typical considerations of
jurisdiction are underemphasized does not mean they disappear.
The question instead is whether the departure from the norm is
justified and acceptable under the Due Process Clause.
Examination of case assignments in MDL from 2011 through
2015 gives one a sense of the extent to which traditional limitations
on personal jurisdiction are ignored in MDL.296 For instance, during
this period, the JPML created MDLs in sixty-six products liability
or personal injury cases. Products liability cases represent the
largest amount of MDL cases.297 To wit, the fifty-nine products
liability MDLs created during this time period eventually included
157,685 transferred cases. Moreover, because products liability
cases are based on state law and in federal court under the diversity
statute,298 by rule, jurisdiction of the district courts is limited to the
states in which they sit.299 That is, a federal district court in, say,
Florida, is limited to the jurisdiction of the State of Florida. For
296. Data on file with author.
297. See Emery G. Lee III et al., Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination,
12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, app. at 231 tbl.A1 (2015). I have chosen to look only at
MDLs involving state law claims because it is in those cases where the jurisdictional issues
are likely to be most important. Because these are cases based on state law, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(k) applies, and the personal jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to
that of the states in which the cases were filed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). Absent the existence
of an MDL, such cases could not be transferred to a federal district court in a state lacking
personal jurisdiction under the current statutory scheme. Because many of the federal claims
involved in MDLs—such as claims under the antitrust or securities statutes—are subject to
specific long-arm provisions, it can be difficult to generalize. Because the jurisdiction of the
federal courts over state law claims in federal court under the diversity statute are all gov-
erned by the same federal jurisdictional provision, Rule 4, they provide a useful example. See
id.
298. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).
299. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
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these reasons, products liability cases are a particularly apt exam-
ple of how jurisdiction is altered by the creation of an MDL because
cases are routinely transferred to courts that would otherwise not
have the power to hear them. Of the products liability MDLs created
between 2011 and 2015, only twelve were located in districts in
which all of the defendant corporations were domiciled or incor-
porated. That is, if one takes the strict readings of Goodyear, Daim-
ler, and BNSF, only twelve of these MDLs were located in courts
that had general jurisdiction over the defendants.300 After Bristol-
Myers, it appears increasingly unlikely that these states would have
specific jurisdiction over all of the cases within the MDL as well.301
Separate issues arise when one shifts focus to plaintiffs. Most
personal jurisdiction cases focus on protecting defendants.302 The
practical reason is obvious: plaintiffs choose the forum in the first
instance. As a result, it is typically defendants who object, either
through a motion to dismiss or a motion to transfer.303 When
plaintiffs do object to personal jurisdiction of the forum they have
initially selected, it is usually because a counterclaim has been
leveled against them. But in these cases, courts have typically held
that by filing suit in a jurisdiction, the plaintiff has consented to its
power to decide claims against him.304
300. Of the 157,685 cases transferred into these MDLs, at most 12,241, or 7.8 percent, were
located in jurisdictions with general jurisdiction over all of the defendants. This number may
be somewhat understated because there are several such MDLs with multiple defendants, one
of which is domiciled in the state of the MDL. Within those MDLs, there may be some cases
against only the defendant domiciled in the MDL state, which would increase these numbers.
Though deeper analysis is warranted, digging into the complaints in those cases is unneces-
sary to make the larger point that many cases are transferred into MDL courts that would
otherwise not have general jurisdiction over the defendant.
301. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779-81
(2017). Bristol-Myers made clear that there must be a connection between each plaintiff’s
claim and the forum state. See id. at 1781-82. Although the question of what type of contact
qualifies remains unclear, it seems straightforward that unless the plaintiff ingested a drug
or was injured in the forum state, the defendant must be engaged in some sort of activity
related to the plaintiff ’s claims within the state, such as manufacturing or designing the
offending the product. See id.
302. See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs’ Due
Process: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871, 873 (1995) (noting
that the courts have been “unconcerned with plaintiffs’ due process”).
303. See VON MEHREN, supra note 62, at 194.
304. See id. Note however that the Restatement of Judgments softens this rule consid-
erably. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 9 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
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That is not to say, however, that plaintiffs are totally unprotected
by due-process-based limitations on personal jurisdiction. The Su-
preme Court confirmed as much in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
in which it held that the plaintiff ’s chosen action is a property right
that cannot be taken without due process of law.305 Shutts was a
hard case because it stretched the limits of the consent-based
rationale for jurisdiction over plaintiffs. The case involved a nation-
wide damages class action filed in Kansas.306 The vast majority of
the class members, however, had no connection with Kansas, and,
if they had been defendants, would certainly not have been subject
to the Court’s jurisdiction.307 Unlike a defendant, if the class action
failed, these plaintiffs would not be subject to coercive action, such
as a damages award or an injunction, but they would have lost the
opportunity to pursue their claims because they would have been
bound by the result.308 Consequently, the Court determined that the
plaintiffs were entitled to some due process protections.309 But the
Court did not conclude that the plaintiffs could not be bound due to
their lack of minimum contacts with Kansas.310 Conceding that most
class members lacked those contacts, the Court instead concluded
that the procedural protections of Kansas’s class action rules
provided sufficient due process protections.311 In particular, the
Court cited the requirements that it assure all absentees were
adequately represented, and that class members have the opportu-
nity to opt out of the class and go it alone in the forum of their
choice.312 Citing Mullane, the Court concluded that these protections
were sufficient even though Kansas may be geographically inconve-
nient.313 The fiduciary nature of representation, supervision of the
judge, and the tacit consent attributed to the decision not to opt out
sufficed.314
305. See 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985).
306. See id. at 800-01.
307. See id. at 801.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 811-13.
310. See id. at 811.
311. See id. at 812-14.
312. See id. at 811-12.
313. See id.
314. See id. at 808-13; see also Mullenix, supra note 302, at 885 (explaining Shutts’s holding
that “the due process rights of absent class members are protected by the opportunity to opt
out of the class and, thereby, preserve the subsequent right to litigate individual damage
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When one looks closely at the basis of the Court’s holding in
Shutts, it becomes apparent why that case does not on its own mean
that personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs is not a problem for MDL.
None of the three protections that effectively stand in for the mini-
mum contacts requirement exist in MDL, despite the fact that the
MDL court can grant judgment against the plaintiffs. There is no
requirement that the court ensure adequate representation, even
though the case is typically litigated by a “steering committee” not
of the plaintiff’s choosing.315 It is true that the court has discretion
to exercise oversight over the steering committee, but not all courts
do, and when they do, they do not employ the exacting criteria of a
class action.316 Nor is there a requirement—or even the ability—in
an MDL for the judge to reject or approve a nonclass settlement.317
And, finally, there is of course no right to opt out of an MDL.318
Indeed, this was a central element of the MDL scheme from the be-
ginning because the drafters believed that if plaintiffs could opt out,
it would eliminate the ability to centralize national control over all
of the cases.319 This inability to opt out, combined with the statisti-
cal unlikelihood that a case will ever return to a plaintiff ’s chosen
forum for trial, makes consent a very thin reed on which to base the
jurisdiction of the MDL court.320
Consider a plaintiff who has filed a case in state court under state
law. If there is diversity jurisdiction, the defendant may remove,
and upon removal the case may be sent to an MDL in any district.
Unlike the general transfer statute, in which a particularized as-
sessment of the convenience of the alternative forum is required,321
MDL can be in a patently inconvenient forum for the plaintiff, one
claims without being bound by the class judgment”); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison,
What the Shutts Opt-out Right Is and What It Ought to Be, 74 UMKC L. REV. 729, 730 (2006).
315. See Burch, supra note 11, at 73.
316. See id. at 73-74.
317. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 12, at 1262-63.
318. See id. at 1270.
319. See id.; Bradt, supra note 187, at 1729 (noting the judges’ view “that a mandatory
MDL statute would be necessary because the voluntary cooperation and good will of the
parties that facilitated the resolution of the electrical-equipment cases was not likely to
recur”).
320. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Participation and Procedure, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 513, 515
(2015) (arguing that “[t]he consent approach to litigation is a poor fit in mass cases” in part
because “it leads judges to acquiesce to a thin, nominal definition of consent”).
321. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
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chosen without any regard to its convenience in any individual
case.322 Once the case is in the MDL forum, the plaintiff exercises
functionally very little control over the litigation, and it may, in fact,
be decided against her due to the MDL court’s undoubted authority
to grant dispositive motions.323 In most large MDLs, what actually
happens is that a settlement agreement is eventually negotiated by
the lead lawyers, and it is likely to be one that leaves the plaintiff
little practical choice but to accept.324
If one believes, as I do, that the primary function of limitations on
personal jurisdiction is to ensure that parties have a real oppor-
tunity to participate in litigation, then the problems of MDL cannot
be wished away by saying that what counts is the personal jurisdic-
tion of the transferor court—the exercise of power by the MDL court
must be reasonable.
322. See supra notes 276-87 and accompanying text; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (requiring
courts to consider “convenience of parties and witnesses” and “the interest of justice”). One
interesting subsidiary question that may deserve additional attention is whether personal
jurisdiction doctrine creates any limitations on transfer under § 1404(a) based on the plain-
tiff ’s minimum contacts with the proposed transferee forum. Some scholars have taken the
view that there ought to be such limitations. See David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer
and the Interest of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 516-17 (1990); Michael J. Waggoner,
Section 1404(a), “Where It Might Have Been Brought”: Brought by Whom?, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV.
67, 87-88. Courts, by and large, have taken the view that there need not be minimum contacts
between the plaintiff and the transferee court, on the grounds that the statutory language
requires an assessment of convenience and that the transferee forum need only be a forum
where the case “might have been brought” against the defendant and that plaintiff consented
to possible transfer by filing in a federal forum. See Murray v. Scott, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1249,
1255 (M.D. Ala. 2001); see also, e.g., In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“There is no requirement under § 1404(a) that a transferee court have jurisdiction over
the plaintiff or that there be sufficient minimum contacts with the plaintiff; there is only a
requirement that the transferee court have jurisdiction over the defendants in the transferred
complaint.”); ESCO Corp. v. Cashman Equip. Co., No. 2:12-cv-01545-RJK-NJK, 2013 WL
4710258, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2013); MyKey Tech., Inc. v. Intelligent Computer Sols., Civil
No. JFM-12-2719, 2012 WL 6698654, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2012). Other courts, however,
have concluded that the transferee court must have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff
under International Shoe, but these are a minority of cases. See Erickson Beamon Ltd. v.
CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5105(NRB), 2013 WL 5355010, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
2013); Nilon v. Nat.-Immunogenics Corp., Civil No. 12-cv-00930-BGS, 2012 WL 2871658, at
*3 (S.D. Cal. July 12, 2012).
323. See Redish & Karaba, supra note 53, at 145.
324. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 12, at 1263.
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III. ASSESSING PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION
In sum, there are significant questions about MDL’s fit with cur-
rent jurisdictional doctrine. Although the Court’s recent decisions
are not intellectually nourishing, they do establish that limitations
on jurisdiction are becoming more strict.325 As MDL continues to
expand while the scope of jurisdiction over state law claims shrinks,
the problem will become more difficult to ignore. And, the Supreme
Court’s recent statement that the jurisdiction of the federal courts
is an open question may push the issue even closer to the fore-
front.326
That the issue of personal jurisdiction in MDL has managed to
avoid rigorous examination for the last fifty years is not surprising
to those who have long focused on the statute’s power.327 MDL’s
surface-level modesty has permitted the avoidance of such ques-
tions, while its tremendous power of aggregation makes them highly
important. Unlike a class action, whose power of aggregation has
nowhere to hide when the aggregate nature of MDL causes depar-
tures from the norms of individual litigation, MDL can take shelter
in its structure as a device of temporary transfer and the technical
availability of trial in the original forum.328 In other words, MDL’s
purported modesty compounds its power.329 Personal jurisdiction is
one example of this broader phenomenon. Under the JPML’s case
law, the purportedly temporary and limited nature of the transfer
gives the MDL court cover, allowing it to avoid a rigorous analysis
325. See supra Part I.A.
326. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783-84 (2017)
(“[W]e leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions
on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.” (citing Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v.
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987))).
327. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 55, at 1471 (characterizing MDL as among “dubious
packaging strategies that are supposedly provisional but that in substantive terms may be
irremediable”).
328. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 841.
329. See id. at 841-42; see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, and
the Line Between, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 889, 898 (2010) (describing MDL as proceeding in a “pro-
cedural no man’s land”); Redish & Karaba, supra note 53, at 154 (“MDL stealthily transforms
fundamental characteristics of numerous claims so that they are unrecognizable as distinct
actions filed by individual plaintiffs.”).
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of whether it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims before it.330
MDL has also managed to avoid serious scrutiny because the doc-
trine of personal jurisdiction remains so unclear. So long as the
fundamental underpinnings of personal jurisdiction remain a mov-
ing target, MDL can dodge and weave, relying simultaneously on
different explanations for why it does not run afoul of the Fifth
Amendment.
But MDL’s ability to avoid serious scrutiny does not mean that
such scrutiny is unwarranted. As MDL has evolved, it has become
clear that the transferee forum is where all of the action occurs
nearly all of the time.331 For defendants, this means that they may
wind up effectively litigating all of the claims against them in a
single federal district located potentially anywhere in the country.332
For plaintiffs, this may mean that their cases are transferred far
away, to a district with no meaningful connection to them or the
facts of their cases.333 Combined with the practical reality that MDL
cases are governed by a court-appointed steering committee, the
transfer may effectively deprive plaintiffs of any control over their
cases until a settlement agreement is proposed.334 Given plaintiffs’
lack of control over whether their cases will wind up in an MDL,
consent is a weak ground on which to base the MDL court’s power.335
Whatever one’s conception of the limits of personal jurisdiction,
these concerns should give pause. And as the Court has become
increasingly stingy, it would appear that MDL and personal juris-
diction may be on a collision course. As a practical matter, one could
certainly imagine a defendant unhappy with the JPML’s choice of
transferee court, or a plaintiff ’s (or her lawyer’s) dismay at being
drawn into a distant MDL, mounting a challenge. In light of the
330. Cf. Redish & Karaba, supra note 53, at 145.
331. See id.
332. In a sense, this replicates the “loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction” en-
dorsed by the California Supreme Court and rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bristol
Myers. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
333. See Lahav, supra note 320, at 514 (noting that in MDLs, “cases are transferred to
districts far away from the place where they were originally filed and are run by a plaintiffs’
management committee”).
334. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 12, at 1271-72; Burch, supra note 11, at 71 (noting that
“competitive checks” by other lawyers on the steering committee’s control of the litigation may
be “absent”).
335. See Lahav, supra note 320, at 514-15 (describing the “thin, nominal definition of
consent ... in mass cases”). 
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Court’s recent array of opinions, it may be challenging to reconcile
the current trend with the expansiveness of MDL’s jurisdictional
power, though that task may confront the Court soon enough.
Though challenging, the task is not impossible. But it does
require thinking about MDL jurisdiction differently, and it requires
returning to the combination of power and reasonableness underly-
ing the Court’s opinion in International Shoe and Mullane, devel-
oped in Part I of this Article. To begin with, it is time to discard the
current rationales employed by the JPML and the courts to justify
MDL jurisdiction. The JPML’s rationale, that all that matters is the
jurisdiction of the transferor court, is based on the sort of legal
fiction that reek of those once used to shoehorn new jurisdictional
imperatives into old doctrine.336 The reality is that the transferee
court does exercise jurisdiction—if for no other reason than its pow-
er to grant summary judgment—and that jurisdiction must pass
constitutional muster.337 The courts’ rationale, that the MDL statute
is an exercise of nationwide jurisdiction, is closer to the truth but is
still insufficient because it suggests that there are no limits to
protect a litigant’s due process rights.338 Moreover, current doctrine
demands both a clear statement that Congress intends nationwide
jurisdiction and a service-of-process regime to support it.339
But to say that current rationales are insufficient is not to say
that MDL is irredeemable. Despite the challenges I have laid out,
I believe MDL, with certain limitations, is consistent with personal
jurisdiction principles, properly understood. That is, if one con-
ceives of jurisdiction as balancing the state’s adjudicatory interest
with the individual’s right to a meaningful opportunity to partici-
pate, MDL can be redeemed.340
336. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (describing “legal fiction[s]”
employed to justify jurisdiction in prior cases).
337. See Redish & Karaba, supra note 53, at 145.
338. See supra Part II.C.
339. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1556 (2017) (“Congress uses this term-
inology because, absent consent, a basis for service of a summons on the defendant is pre-
requisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” (citing Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987))); Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S.
97, 106 (1987) (rejecting “an implied provision for nationwide service of process in a private
cause of action”).
340. See Redish & Beste, supra note 93, at 923; Resnik, supra note 5, at 1804 (“In sum,
both Mullane and Rule 23 altered the landscape of litigation by reconceptualizing the capacity
of courts to generate decisions binding individuals—which is to say, changing the meaning
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In my view, the Court should require that there be proper
jurisdiction in both the transferor court and the transferee court,
but measured under different criteria. There must be jurisdiction in
the transferor court under the state long-arm statute, imported into
the federal court under Rule 4. Requiring this serves several pur-
poses. It eliminates the need for separate service of process under
the MDL statute, and it ensures a convenient location for trial.
Ensuring a home district that has jurisdiction under the normal
rules also provides a reasonable, if imperfect, mechanism for ensur-
ing that appropriate state law will apply to each case—a necessary
component to my framework for reasons I will describe below.341
There must also, however, be jurisdiction in the transferee court,
but measured under a different standard. One need not go so far as
to say that jurisdiction in any federal district court is justified by the
nationwide territorial sovereignty of the federal government to
recognize that the jurisdiction of the federal courts need not be
limited by state boundaries.342 But to say that jurisdiction in a
federal court in one state is acceptable does not necessarily imply
that jurisdiction in the federal courts of any state is acceptable. The
limits, rather, should be based on an assessment of reasonableness
under the circumstances, and those limits vary somewhat depend-
ing on whether one takes the perspective of the plaintiff or the
defendant.343
In sum, what this solution attempts to accomplish is an appropri-
ate balance of interests; that is, a balance between the national
interest in efficient resolution of nationwide controversies and the
individual’s interest in meaningful participation. To begin with, one
might reasonably ask: What is the national interest in dispute
resolution? I believe such an interest may be found in the MDL
of what constituted ‘due process’ in courts.”); cf. Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and
“Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction,
98 NW. U. L. REV. 455, 468 (2004).
341. Such a reading is also consistent with the text and history of the statute. There is no
evidence to suggest that the drafters of the MDL statute or Congress intended that the
statute provide for nationwide service of process.
342. See Burbank, supra note 76, at 116.
343. See Clermont, supra note 59, at 416 (“With some indulgence, one could read Interna-
tional Shoe as reducing the power test to ... a rough rule of thumb, with its outcome always
subject to revision under the ultimate test of reasonableness. So to get to the basics, instead
of asking whether the target of the action was subject to the state’s power, one should ask
whether jurisdiction was reasonable in view of all the interests involved.”).
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statute itself,344 the purpose of which was to enable private enforce-
ment of the law through efficient management of litigation in a
single federal forum.345 Indeed, this was the entire point of MDL
from the perspective of the judges who fought for the statute’s pas-
sage—they believed that the litigation explosion that they correctly
predicted would threaten to overwhelm the federal courts.346 Such
a deluge, without machinery to manage it, would both threaten the
legitimacy of the federal courts and make perpetual backlog a
weapon for better-resourced defendants.347 What was necessary was
a reconception of the federal courts as a unitary institution capable
of deploying its power through centralized organization of liti-
gation.348 Congress again invoked this interest when it passed the
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) of 2005.349 The difference, of
course, was that MDL was designed to facilitate aggregate litiga-
tion, while CAFA was intended to crush it.350 Nevertheless, both
344. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
345. Tobias Barrington Wolff has suggested such a possibility in connection with case-
management and settlement-review functions of MDL judges, writing that “the MDL statute
in particular has received inadequate attention as a source of federal law on important
matters of litigation policy.” See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Commentary, Managerial Judging
and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1058 (2013).
346. See supra Part II.A.
347. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 839 (noting that these judges believed that “defendants,
for whom delay was a weapon—would only perpetuate backlogs”).
348. See id. (“The drafters believed that their creation would reshape federal litigation and
become the primary mechanism for processing the wave of nationwide mass-tort litigation
they predicted was headed the federal courts’ way.”).
349. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Overhearing Part of a Conversation: Shutts as a Moment in
a Long Dialogue, 74 UMKC L. REV. 779, 780 (2006) (describing the Class Action Fairness Act
as “a small step toward the more intelligent deployment of diversity jurisdiction” to “federal-
iz[e]” cases “with broad national roots”); see also Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated
Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (2008). MDL, too, plays this role, and its
modification of otherwise applicable restrictions on diversity jurisdiction can be seen in ser-
vice of this goal.
350. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 140 (2017) (“[T]he strategy of those
proponents of CAFA whose actual agenda, in vastly expanding the jurisdiction of federal
courts to hear state law claims brought as class actions, was to ensure that the cases were not
certified and went away.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses
of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1942 (2006) (“[It] is apparent to any
sentient reader of the statute’s statement of findings and purposes ... [that they] are, at best,
window dressing. Less charitably, they meet the philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s definition of
‘bullshit,’ because they are made with apparent indifference to their truth content.” (footnote
omitted)).
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statutes recognize a national interest in resolving cases of national
scope.351 MDL serves that interest through centralization.
This legitimate national interest must, however, be balanced
against the individual interest in meaningful participation that
limitations on personal jurisdiction serve, while also recognizing the
benefits of aggregation in MDL that accrue to both plaintiffs and
defendants.352 The structure I have proposed—which demands ju-
risdiction in the transferor court under traditional rules and
jurisdiction in the transferee court using a more flexible interest
assessment—attempts that balance.353 Ensuring meaningful
participation requires that the JPML admit some limitations on its
power that it currently denies354—in theory, if not in practice. The
first step, then, in applying the analysis is to recognize that not just
any district will do for all MDL cases.
When it comes to MDLs that are not of nationwide scope, the
district chosen should be one that is relatively central to the parties.
For instance, it would not have been reasonable to locate the MDL
dealing with the British Petroleum Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico in
a federal court in the Pacific Northwest. Establishing the MDL in
reasonable proximity to the accident best facilitates meaningful
participation by the plaintiffs in a location to which defendants
could hardly object, because specific jurisdiction would be available
even without MDL consolidation.355 As a practical matter, this has
351. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1921 (2008) (“CAFA
accelerated the growing centralization of American law.”); see also Samuel Issacharoff &
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1358, 1416 (2006).
352. See Resnik, supra note 7, at 1044 (describing how aggregation devices, such as the
class action, have “transformed our understanding of what lawsuits can do”); see also Bradt
& Rave, supra note 12, at 1266-67.
353. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 1806 (“Federal rules and statutes need to enable
aggregation because neither judges, litigants, nor the public fare well in a lawyer-less world,
where economic disparities among disputants vitiate the potential for access to a fair
process—or access to any process at all. What the current federal docket illustrates is that
federal courts themselves benefit from class and aggregate proceedings. But the individuals
affected and the public at large have too attenuated a relationship with the resulting
remedies. Constitutional reinvention is again in order to enable, constrain, and legitimate the
distributional decisions made.” (footnote omitted)).
354. See In re FMC Corp. Patent Litig., 422 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (per
curiam).
355. Or, if jurisdiction over all claims were not available in a single state, locating the MDL
within the same region would not be so onerously inconvenient or unfairly surprising.
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not been a problem when it comes to geographically centralized
events. The MDL statute demands convenience,356 and the JPML
has followed common sense.357
The harder cases are those of nationwide scope, which, as the
JPML has recognized on several occasions, have no natural geo-
graphic focal point.358 These cases—typically involving products
liability or consumer fraud claims—also make up the lion’s share of
MDLs.359 In these cases, because the products are distributed on a
national scale, there is no single district that is going to be conve-
nient for all parties. It is in these cases, however, that the national
interest in dispute resolution is likely to be most urgently felt. These
are cases with enormous numbers of victims, spread all around the
country. In cases like these, which transferee districts make sense?
One possibility might be to require that such cases be located in
a district court in the state where the defendant is subject to general
jurisdiction. If nothing else, such a conclusion would seem to be
consistent with the concerns underlying the Court’s decisions in
Goodyear,360 Daimler,361 and BNSF,362 if only because they would
provide the defendant with a measure of predictability. But there
are significant problems with this approach. First, in many MDLs
it is impracticable because there are multiple defendants hailing
from different states or the defendant is neither incorporated nor
has its principal place of business in the United States, meaning
that there is no federal district in a state with general jurisdic-
tion.363 Second, this arguably tilts the scales too far in favor of the
defendant, which would find itself able to ensure that nearly all
356. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
357. See supra Part II.C. A glance at the pending MDL docket reveals that this is the case.
See, e.g., In re Air Crash at S.F., Cal., on July 6, 2013, 987 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1378 (J.P.M.L.
2013) (granting the defendant’s motion for centralization in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia); In re Air Crash Near Rio Grande, P.R., on December 3, 2008, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1361,
1361 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (granting the plaintiffs’ motion for centralization in the Southern
District of Florida).
358. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
359. See Lee et al., supra note 297, app. at 231 tbl.A1.
360. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
361. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014).
362. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017).
363. See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 22) (draft on file with author) (describing difficulties
created by the restrictive rule in Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF ).
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litigation against it will go forward on its home turf, without regard
to the interests of the plaintiff. At least in individual litigation, the
plaintiff may choose her home state, which almost certainly has
specific jurisdiction.364 But once an MDL is established, the cases
will be transferred, not to return for a long time, if at all.365 One
might also imagine that the MDL should be established in a state
with specific jurisdiction over all of the claims against the defen-
dant. But Bristol-Myers teaches that such jurisdictions will be rare,
unless there is a single state in which the defendant engaged in
conduct that caused the full set of claims.366 Even under that
circumstance, though, the defendant might be accused of a sort of
preemptive forum shopping by engaging in such conduct only in
friendly forums.367
What, then, is the JPML to do in MDLs of nationwide scope? In
a real sense, these MDLs are too big to fail; that is, it would be
ironic for MDL to be hamstrung in the circumstances in which it is
most needed. I have several suggestions.
First, the MDL must be located in a major metropolitan area,
reasonably accessible by attorneys on both sides. Recognizing that
no district will be ideal for plaintiffs scattered around the country
or defendants forced to litigate far from their headquarters, at least
locating the MDL in a place that can be reached relatively easily
will mitigate the problem. With respect to defendants, the analysis
is familiar: Is the location of the forum an example of what Profes-
sors Arthur Miller and David Crump call “distant forum abuse”?368
364. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
365. See Lahav, supra note 320, at 513-14 (“Many of these cases are transferred to districts
far away from the place where they were originally filed and are run by a plaintiffs’ manage-
ment committee.... These realities challenge the idea that every person is entitled to his or her
day in court because the system is not structured to offer that experience to each and every
litigant.”).
366. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-
Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 3-4) (on file with author) (describing restrictions on specific jurisdiction
in mass tort cases created by Bristol-Myers).
367. See id. (manuscript at 39) (“The defendant has still had the opportunity to
preemptively designate the forum as a potential one where it might be sued. That is, going
forward, defendants can choose to engage in conduct directed nationwide in states where they
deem the risk of suit on claims relating to that conduct acceptable—a sort of ex ante forum
shopping.”).
368. See Miller & Crump, supra note 159, at 54. 
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That is, has the MDL been placed in a location where it is unconsti-
tutionally inconvenient for a defendant to essentially defend the
entire universe of claims against it?369 The answer will likely be “no”
if the defendant is a large corporation doing business nationwide,
and the defendant does a substantial business in or around the
MDL forum. Such a defendant will typically have the resources
available to ensure sufficient representation in a metropolitan area.
Of course, the real concern for defendants may not be the inconve-
nience of the forum but the risk that the forum chosen will be more
plaintiff friendly for different reasons—such as the identity of the
MDL judge or the local jury pool likely to hear possible influential
bellwether trials. For instance, a defendant may prefer another
state to California regardless of where its principal place of business
is located because of concerns about California judges and juries.370
These concerns, however, are not cognizable in the personal
jurisdiction analysis, particularly in the federal court context, and
especially in diversity jurisdiction (where there is a presumptive
neutrality)371 and when the MDL forum is selected by the JPML and
not the plaintiff, as in a nationwide class action.372
Any such analysis must also, of course, take into account the
benefits to defendants of aggregation. Although defendants fought
the statute vigorously in the 1960s, in the intervening decades they
have come to recognize the benefits of aggregation, particularly
when it comes to the possibility of resolving liability in a nationwide
litigation in one shot, perhaps through summary judgment or a
mass settlement.373 Even an MDL in a somewhat inconvenient for-
um may be preferable for a defendant to litigating piecemeal around
the country.374 A clear-eyed assessment, then, suggests that unless
369. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (“[T]he ‘primary concern’ is the ‘burden on the
defendant.’” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1982))).
370. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 373 (manuscript at 2) (describing the candid admission
by attorneys in Bristol-Myers that California was simply too friendly a forum for plaintiffs).
371. 1 THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 75 (Steven Harmon Wilson ed., 2012).
372. Cf. Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National
Debate About “Class Action Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1374, 1379-80 (2005) (describing
the application of the Fifth Amendment to defendants in federal class actions).
373. See Bradt, supra note 7, at 834-36. This is not to say that defendants do not believe
that there are deficiencies in MDL practice, which they are currently seeking to solve through
statutory means. See Resnik, supra note 7, at 1052 (noting efforts to amend the MDL statute
via the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017).
374. See D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND.
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the forum is especially inconvenient, MDL will in most cases be
constitutionally reasonable for well-resourced defendants, and the
MDL need not be located in the defendant’s home state. One could
imagine an MDL located so far away from the defendant’s home
that it would raise constitutional concerns, but so long as the JPML
continues to favor major cities,375 however, defendants will usually
have few complaints.
Second, there must be additional safeguards to ensure that plain-
tiffs have the ability to participate in MDL proceedings. Under-
standing that no location will be geographically convenient for a
nationwide set of plaintiffs, measures must be taken to mitigate the
difficulties of distance. The idea that accommodations must be made
to protect the plaintiff is somewhat unusual in the jurisdictional
analysis. Typically, jurisdiction over the plaintiff is a given because
she has consented by filing her case.376 But the consent rationale is
a thin reed on which to entirely justify the jurisdiction of the MDL
transferee court.377 As noted above, unlike class actions, plaintiffs do
not have the right to opt out of an MDL, nor is there any required
determination of adequacy of representation by the district court,
even though steering committee lawyers will control the litiga-
tion.378 And while it is true that the plaintiff has filed a case, often
the plaintiff has filed her case in state court only to see it removed
and transferred to the MDL. Even for plaintiffs who have filed cases
in federal court, consent to an MDL across the country borders on
the fictional.379 At the same time, it is important to recognize the
benefits to plaintiffs of MDL: as was intended by its creators, MDL
L. REV. 1183, 1193-95 (2013).
375. U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION TERMIN-
ATED THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2016, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_
Terminated_Litigations-FY-2016_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUC5-AB5Z].
376. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
377. See Lahav, supra note 320, at 515 (describing the “thin, nominal definition of consent
... in mass cases”).
378. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); Miller & Crump, supra
note 159, at 16.
379. It is of course true that plaintiffs do not “consent” whenever a case is transferred. But
there are at least some protections when a defendant makes a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (2012). Not only must the court engage in analysis to ensure that the transferee
court is specifically convenient for the parties, but also the transferee court must be one where
the case might have been brought, bringing into play the restrictions of the venue statute,
which go some distance in ensuring convenience.
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facilitates economies of scale that level the playing field with
typically better-resourced defendants.380 But to say that MDL offers
benefits to plaintiffs does not extinguish plaintiffs’ due process
rights to participate meaningfully in the proceedings.381
Courts, therefore, should take advantage of the benefits of mod-
ern communications technology.382 As many MDL judges have
already done, every MDL should have a user-friendly website, from
which all orders, transcripts, and schedules can be retrieved.383 In
addition, all MDL hearings, depositions, and trials should be web-
cast, with the recordings made available on the case website. While
every plaintiff may not be able to physically attend proceedings,
modern technology makes observation a relatively straightforward
task. Once the case reaches a settlement stage, the settlement
agreement should be available to view, and it should be explained
in plain English.384 Alongside the settlement agreement should also
be a notice of the right to return for trial, as required by the MDL
statute.385
Third, and to return full circle, it is important to preserve the
right to remand to the transferor court386—one which has jurisdic-
tion under Rule 4. Other scholars have written about the impor-
tance of the right to remand in influencing a fair settlement.387 I
agree that the remand potential demanded by the statute plays an
important role throughout the litigation—indeed, it may be the
judge’s most potent tool to ensure fair negotiations.388 Beyond that,
however, the possibility to return home for trial is a necessary com-
380. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 12, at 1267, 1307.
381. See Mullenix, supra note 302, at 911 (“There are few sound reasons why plaintiffs’ due
process rights ought not be symmetrical with those of a defendant with regard to a state’s as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction.”)
382. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 846, 850-53 (2017); Redish & Karaba, supra note 53, at 152-53 (suggesting the
increased use of modern technology as a means of reducing due process concerns, though still
rejecting MDL).
383. See, e.g., Multicircuit Petitions, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://www.
jpml.uscourts.gov/multicircuit-petitions [https://perma.cc/Y6LK-AFXP].
384. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 12, at 1287-88 (collecting websites and other examples
of similar technology).
385. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(ii) (2012).
386. Id. § 1407(a).
387. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 690,
692-93 (2013).
388. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 12, at 1304-06.
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ponent in making the MDL scheme fit with the demands of personal
jurisdiction. This is in part because it ensures that there will be a
convenient forum in which the plaintiff may have a day in court,
should she want one. To be clear, I am neither unrealistic nor ro-
mantic when it comes to plaintiffs’ returning home for trial. Such
trials should only occur when plaintiffs decide that a proposed set-
tlement is unacceptable, or a settlement cannot be reached in the
MDL court. When MDL works well, such trials will typically be
unnecessary. 
But there is a separate reason why there needs to be a home
forum with proper jurisdiction: choice of law. Most MDLs of nation-
wide scope are made up of cases asserting state law torts; that is,
there is no federal substantive law governing the cases. In MDL, the
cases are governed by the state law that would control had the cases
not been transferred into the MDL.389 As I have argued before, the
MDL statute does not create any power to depart from the rule of
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,390 which prohibits
the federal courts from following a federal common law choice of law
when sitting in diversity.391 Indeed, one of the main benefits of MDL
is that it can facilitate aggregation without depriving plaintiffs of
the law that would otherwise properly govern their claims.392
More broadly, to say that there is a federal adjudicatory interest
in efficient resolution of nationwide torts justifies a relaxed notion
of personal jurisdiction. But this adjudicatory interest does not
displace the states’ regulatory interest in cases with which it has a
connection, or the plaintiffs’ interest in receiving the benefit of the
law that would otherwise apply. To hold otherwise would function-
ally undermine Erie and Klaxon by altering the law that would
otherwise apply based on only the “accident of diversity” jurisdic-
389. See, e.g., In re Volkswagen & Audi Warranty Extension Litig., 692 F.3d 4, 17 (1st Cir.
2012).
390. See 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
391. Bradt, supra note 91, at 816-20 (positing a rule of “choice-of-law neutrality” for mass
tort litigation).
392. See id.; see also Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
547, 565-74 (1996) (arguing against the principle that applicable law should change to accom-
modate mass-litigation procedure); Patrick Woolley, Choice of Law and the Protection of Class
Members in Class Suits Certified Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 799, 801.
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tion.393 Ensuring that there is a home district—which applies that
district’s law—for the case to return to, if necessary, also mitigates
the problems of nationwide jurisdiction in the MDL transferee court
from the perspective of the plaintiffs.
Fourth, and finally, this framework suggests a need for some
oversight of the JPML. While the current JPML does a fine job, and
cases that are unconstitutionally transferred may ultimately be few,
there still needs to be a plausible check on egregious JPML action.394
Departing from the current mandamus remedy may not be neces-
sary—and constant litigation of the JPML’s decisions may not be
desirable—but the courts of appeal should remain attentive to the
JPML’s actions and be prepared to act as more than a rubber stamp,
particularly if the Panel begins to pursue an agenda different from
the status quo.
Together, these proposals aim to provide a starting point for a
conversation about how to think about personal jurisdiction in MDL.
Different circumstances may warrant different approaches. Overall,
though, the goal is to shift the thinking about personal jurisdiction
away from the formalistic explanations by courts and the Panel to
a more functional balancing of interests. MDL cannot work
effectively if it lets the perfect be the enemy of the good; at the same
time, MDL need not hide behind fictions to survive constitutional
scrutiny so long as appropriate attention is paid to the interests
underlying jurisdictional limitations.
CONCLUSION
Two of the most significant developments in American civil
litigation in the last decade have been the rapid ascendance of MDL
as the preferred mechanism for litigating mass torts and the Su-
preme Court’s vigorous reclamation of its role in restricting personal
jurisdiction. These two developments are, however, at odds with one
another. MDL essentially admits of no restrictions on personal
jurisdiction, but to do so the JPML and federal courts have had to
rely on fictions and inaccuracies. That MDL has been able to skate
on questions of jurisdiction is typical of MDL generally, in that
393. See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496-97.
394. See Pollis, supra note 41, at 1647 (suggesting interlocutory review in MDL).
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many questions of due process salient in individual cases are
diminished in the name of efficient resolution of mass controversies.
But to say that current explanations of MDL’s expansive jurisdic-
tional reach are wrong or incomplete does not make MDL unconsti-
tutional. Rather, they require us to look at MDL in a more realistic
way and take seriously whether the power it concentrates in a
single federal judge is constitutionally justified. In an era of MDL
ascendancy, a clear-eyed approach to such issues is long overdue.
